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Rent seeking and collusion in the military allocation decisions of Finland, Sweden, and Great Britain, 1920–381

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  • JARI ELORANTA

Abstract

Analysis of military acquisition policies in Finland, Sweden, and Great Britain in the period from 1920 to 1938 produces evidence of rent seeking, both quantitative and qualitative, in all three cases. The Finnish institutional environment offered the most extensive rents and collusion opportunities, which translated into tangible price advantages for domestic producers. The Swedish and British domestic producers operated under more efficient institutions and thus had to settle for more moderate rents. Evolving institutional environments determined the extent of the rent seeking.

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  • Jari Eloranta, 2009. "Rent seeking and collusion in the military allocation decisions of Finland, Sweden, and Great Britain, 1920–381," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 62(1), pages 23-44, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ehsrev:v:62:y:2009:i:1:p:23-44
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0289.2008.00427.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Jari Eloranta, 2015. "Pro Bono Publico? Demand for military spending between the World Wars," Working Papers 15016, Economic History Society.

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