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Regulatory Disequilibrium and Inefficiency: The Case of Interstate Trucking

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  • Benson, Bruce L

Abstract

Economic regulation is characterized as (1) an effort by special interests to influence the allocation of property rights, in (2) a continuous path-dependent spontaneous evolution (as opposed to a static equilibrium), driven by (3) market, political, and bureaucratic entrepreneurship in an ongoing discovery process. The implications of the model are illustrated by an examination of the evolution of regulation in interstate trucking. The model is also used to explain that the Chicago School's political-regulatory efficiency conclusions are incorrect, and that the inefficiencies arising from rent seeking are even greater than the Public Choice approach implies. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Austrian Economics.

Volume (Year): 15 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (June)
Pages: 229-55

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Handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:15:y:2002:i:2-3:p:229-55

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100335

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Cited by:
  1. Diana W. Thomas, 2009. "Deregulation despite transitional gains," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 329-340, September.
  2. Adam Martin & Diana Thomas, 2013. "Two-tiered political entrepreneurship and the congressional committee system," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 21-37, January.
  3. Diana W. Thomas & Peter T. Leeson, 2012. "Purpose – This paper seeks to examine how productive entrepreneurial activities, such as innovation, influence unproductive entrepreneurial activities, such as regulatory rent seeking. Design/method," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 1(4), pages 84-95, April.
  4. Douhan, Robin & Henrekson, Magnus, 2007. "The Political Economy of Entrepreneurship," Working Paper Series 716, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  5. Harper, David A., 2013. "Property rights, entrepreneurship and coordination," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 62-77.
  6. Joshua Shackman & Glen Tenney, 2006. "The Effects of Government Regulations on the Supply of Pawn Loans: Evidence from 51 Jurisdictions in the U.S," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 69-91, August.

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