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Role‐Reversal Consistency: An Experimental Study Of The Golden Rule

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  • Miguel A. Costa‐Gomes
  • Yuan Ju
  • Jiawen Li

Abstract

We report an experiment that asks whether people in a strategic situation behave according to the Golden Rule, that is, do not treat others in ways that they find disagreeable to themselves, a property that we call role‐reversal consistency. Overall, we find that over three quarters of the subjects are role‐reversal consistent. Regression analysis suggests that this finding is not driven by players maximizing their subjective expected monetary earnings given their stated beliefs about their opponents' behavior. We find that subjects' stated beliefs and actions reveal mild projection bias. (JEL C78, C91)

Suggested Citation

  • Miguel A. Costa‐Gomes & Yuan Ju & Jiawen Li, 2019. "Role‐Reversal Consistency: An Experimental Study Of The Golden Rule," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(1), pages 685-704, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:57:y:2019:i:1:p:685-704
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12708
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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