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Promoting rule compliance in daily-life: Evidence from a randomized field experiment in the public libraries of Barcelona

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  • Jose Apesteguia

    ()

  • Patricia Funk
  • Nagore Iriberri

Abstract

We study how to promote compliance with rules in everyday situations. Having access to unique data on the universe of users of all public libraries in Barcelona, we test the effect of sending email messages with di erent contents. We find that users return their items earlier if asked to do so in a simple email. Emails reminding users of the penalties associated with late returns are more effective than emails with only a generic reminder. We find differential treatment effects by user types. The characteristics we analyze are previous compliance, gender, age, and nationality.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 1231.

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Date of creation: Aug 2010
Date of revision: Feb 2011
Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1231

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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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Keywords: Rule Compliance; Field Experiment; Public Libraries.;

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Cited by:
  1. Altmann, Steffen & Traxler, Christian, 2012. "Nudges at the Dentist," IZA Discussion Papers 6699, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Linardi, Sera & Tanaka, Tomomi, 2013. "Competition as a savings incentive: A field experiment at a homeless shelter," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 240-251.

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