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The Impact Of A New Federal Reserve Chairman

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  • EDWARD J. KANE

Abstract

This paper treats appointing a Federal Reserve Chairman as a portfolio investment made by the United States President. It models Ronald Reagan's 1987 choice between Paul Volcker and other candidates as a trade‐off between a potentially unfavorable short‐term market response to replacing Volcker and various long‐term political benefits from installing Reagan's own man. The paper discusses possible effects of Alan Greenspan's chairmanship on the trajectory of future monetary policy, on the Fed's preferences for financial reform, and on the Fed's corporate culture.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward J. Kane, 1988. "The Impact Of A New Federal Reserve Chairman," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 6(1), pages 89-97, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:6:y:1988:i:1:p:89-97
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00281.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kane, Edward J., 1980. "Politics and Fed policymaking : The more things change the more they remain the same," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 199-211, April.
    2. Fischer, Stanley & Huizinga, John, 1982. "Inflation, Unemployment, and Public Opinion Polls," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 14(1), pages 1-19, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander W. Salter & William J. Luther, 2019. "Adaptation and central banking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 243-256, September.
    2. Jordan, Jerry L. & Luther, William J., 2022. "Central bank independence and the Federal Reserve's new operating regime," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 510-515.

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