Sharecropping efficiency in Ethiopia: threats of eviction and kinship
AbstractWe tested a theoretical model with the Marshallian inefficiency (H1) and threat of eviction (H2) hypotheses having opposite effects on land productivity on sharecropped plots. The model also assumes that kinship contracts may eliminate or reduce the Marshallian inefficiency (H3) and threat of eviction (H4) effects on land productivity. Our empirical findings were consistent with H2 and H4 being true. We found higher land productivity on sharecropped plots than on share tenants' own plots and higher land productivity on sharecropped plots of nonkin than of kin tenants. The nature of the data allowed controlling for unobservable household characteristics through household fixed effects and for observable plot characteristics. Analyses with and without plot characteristics revealed that these findings were stronger with plot characteristics than without them. Based on the plausible assumption that observable plot characteristics are positively correlated with unobservable plot characteristics this strengthens our conclusion. The results are also supported by first-order stochastic dominance analysis. Sharecropped plots' output value distribution unambiguously dominated the output value distribution from share tenants' own plots. Nonkin sharecropped plots' output value distribution also first-order stochastically dominated the output value distribution from kin sharecrop plots. Copyright 2007 International Association of Agricultural Economists.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by International Association of Agricultural Economists in its journal Agricultural Economics.
Volume (Year): 37 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (09)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0169-5150
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kassie, Menale & Jaleta, Moti & Shiferaw, Bekele & Mmbando, Frank & Muricho, Geoffrey, 2012. "Plot and Household-Level Determinants of Sustainable Agricultural Practices in Rural Tanzania," Discussion Papers dp-12-02-efd, Resources For the Future.
- Hotopp, Henning & MuÃŸhoff, Oliver, 2012. "Can rent adjustment clauses reduce the income risk of farms?," International Journal of Agricultural Management, Institute of Agricultural Management & International Farm Management Association, vol. 1(4), July.
- Beyene, Abebe D. & Bezabih, Mintewab & Gebreegziabher, Zenebe, 2012. "Contract Duration under Incomplete Land Ownership Rights: Empirical Evidence from Rural Ethiopia," Discussion Papers dp-12-09-efd, Resources For the Future.
- Aryal, Jeetendra P. & Holden, Stein T., 2011.
"Livestock and Land Share Contracts in a Hindu Society,"
CLTS Working Papers
7/11, Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences.
- Jeetendra P. Aryal & Stein T. Holden, 2012. "Livestock and land share contracts in a Hindu society," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 43(5), pages 593-606, 09.
- Bellemare, Marc F., 2010. "Insecure Land Rights and Share Tenancy in Madagascar," MPRA Paper 23640, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kassie, Menale & Jaleta, Moti & Shiferaw, Bekele A. & Mmbando, Frank & Mekuria, Mulugetta, 2012. "Interdependence in Farmer Technology Adoption Decisions in Smallholder Systems: Joint Estimation of Investments in Sustainable Agricultural Practices in Rural Tanzania," 2012 Conference, August 18-24, 2012, Foz do Iguacu, Brazil 126791, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Deininger, Klaus & Ali, Daniel Ayalew & Alemu, Tekie, 2011. "Productivity effects of land rental markets in Ethiopia : Evidence from a matched tenant-landlord sample," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5727, The World Bank.
- Fenske, James, 2011. "Land tenure and investment incentives: Evidence from West Africa," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 137-156, July.
- Hagos, Hosaena Gebru & Holden, Stein T., 2013. "Reverse-share-tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Landownersâ€™ bargaining power and sharecroppersâ€™ productivity," IFPRI discussion papers 1270, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Ndoye Niane, Aifa Fatimata & Burger, Kees & Bulte, Erwin H., 2010. "Horticultural Households Profit Optimization and the Efficiency of Labour Contract Choice," 2010 AAAE Third Conference/AEASA 48th Conference, September 19-23, 2010, Cape Town, South Africa 95776, African Association of Agricultural Economists (AAAE) & Agricultural Economics Association of South Africa (AEASA).
- Ghebru, Hosaena H. & Holden, Stein T., 2012.
"Reverse-Share-Tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Bargaining Power of Landowners and the Sharecropper’s Productivity,"
2012 Conference, August 18-24, 2012, Foz do Iguacu, Brazil
126883, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Ghebru, Hosaena H. & Holden, Stein T., 2012. "Reverse Share-Tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Bargaining Power of Landowners and the Sharecroppers’ Productivity," CLTS Working Papers 2/12, Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.