1. Kandori, Michihiro, 2002. "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 1-15, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Malcomson, James M, 1984. "Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(3), pages 486-507, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Radner, Roy, 1985. "Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1173-98, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 627-652, May.
7. Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 507, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, . "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," IEW - Working Papers iewwp095, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
   • Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3185, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   • Ernst Fehr, 2003. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," Microeconomics 0305010, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological foundations of incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Abreu, Dilip & Milgrom, Paul & Pearce, David, 1991. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1713-33, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Abreu, D. & Milgrom, P. & Pearce, D., 1990. "Information And Timing In Repeated Partnerships," Papers e-90-14, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
   • David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Paul R. Milgrom, 1988. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 875, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
10. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-15, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Sherwin Rosen, 1985. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 1668, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 106-150, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Pearce, David G. & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1998. "The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 75-96, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2003. "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 216-240, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Bentley MacLeod, 2001. "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000036, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
14. Baker, George & Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1994. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1125-56, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1993. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," NBER Working Papers 4480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Jonathan Levin, 2003. "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 835-857, June. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Jonathan Levin, 2000. "Relational Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 01002, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
16. Kahn, Charles & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1988. "A Competitive Efficiency Wage Model with Keynesian Features," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(4), pages 609-45, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 151-188, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 2002. "Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 39-84, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2002. "Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 229-248, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Gibbons, Robert & Waldman, Michael, 1999. "Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 36, pages 2373-2437 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 16-39, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring," Game Theory and Information 9809004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
22. Massimiliano Amarante, 2003. "Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 353-374, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
24. Malcomson, James M., 1999. "Individual employment contracts," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 35, pages 2291-2372 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Malcomson, J., 1998. "Individual Employment Contracts," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9804, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
25. Garvey, Gerald T., 1995. "Why reputation favors joint ventures over vertical and horizontal integration A simple model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 387-397, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
26. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
27. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1989. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 447-80, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 1986. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment," Working Papers 585, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
28. W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 1998. "Job Characteristics and the Form of Compensation," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-08, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
29. Yeon-Koo Che & Seung-Weon Yoo, 2001. "Optimal Incentives for Teams," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 525-541, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
30. Brown, Martin & Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst, 2002. "Contractual Incompleteness and the Nature of Market Interactions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3272, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Martin Brown & Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr, . "Contractual Incompleteness and the Nature of Market Interactions," IEW - Working Papers iewwp038, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
31. Edward P. Lazear, 1999. "Output-based Pay: Incentives or Sorting?," NBER Working Papers 7419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
32. Jonathan Levin, 2002. "Multilateral Contracting And The Employment Relationship," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 1075-1103, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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1. Crémer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1991. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," IDEI Working Papers 5, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Cremer, J. & Khalil, F., 1991. "Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract," Working Papers 91-16, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
   • Cremer, J. & Khalil, F., 1991. "Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-16, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
   • Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1992. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 566-78, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Anton Suvorov & Jeroen van de Ven, 2006. "Discretionary Bonuses as a Feedback Mechanism," Working Papers w0088, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]