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Why reputation favors joint ventures over vertical and horizontal integration A simple model

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  • Garvey, Gerald T.
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

    Volume (Year): 28 (1995)
    Issue (Month): 3 (December)
    Pages: 387-397

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:28:y:1995:i:3:p:387-397

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    1. Sanford J Grossman & Oliver D Hart, 2001. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000339, David K. Levine.
    2. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
    3. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    4. Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    5. Segerstrom, Paul S., 1991. "On the feasibility of maximal collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 234-238, June.
    6. Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," Working papers 448, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    7. Radner, Roy, 1991. "Dynamic games in organization theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-2), pages 217-260, July.
    8. Malueg, D.A., 1990. "Collusive Behavior And Partial Ownership Of Rivals," Papers, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division 90-9, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
    9. Joskow, Paul L, 1988. "Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 95-117, Spring.
    10. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    11. Radner, Roy, 1989. "Dynamic Games in Organization Theory," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 228, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised Feb 1991.
    12. Teece, David J., 1992. "Competition, cooperation, and innovation : Organizational arrangements for regimes of rapid technological progress," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-25, June.
    13. Masanori Hashimoto, 1990. "The Japanese Labor Market in a Comparative Perspective with the United States," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number jlm.
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