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How Portable Is Level‐0 Behavior? A Test of Level‐k Theory in Games With Non‐Neutral Frames

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Cited by:

  1. Shurchkov, Olga, 2016. "Public announcements and coordination in dynamic global games: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 20-30.
  2. Wright, James R. & Leyton-Brown, Kevin, 2017. "Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 16-37.
  3. Marco Mantovani, 2015. "Limited backward induction: foresight and behavior in sequential games," Working Papers 289, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2015.
  4. Subhasish M Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock & David Rojo Arjona & Nathaniel T Wilcox, 2021. "Focality and Asymmetry in Multi-Battle Contests," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(636), pages 1593-1619.
  5. Crawford, Vincent P., 2018. "“Fatal Attraction” and Level-k thinking in games with Non-neutral frames," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 219-224.
  6. Navarro, Noemí & Veszteg, Róbert F., 2020. "On the empirical validity of axioms in unstructured bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 117-145.
  7. Marco Serena, 2017. "A Belief-based Theory for Private Information Games," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-12, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  8. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier, 2021. "Cognitive sophistication and deliberation times," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 558-592, June.
  9. Seth Frey & Robert L. Goldstone, 2018. "Cognitive mechanisms for human flocking dynamics," Journal of Computational Social Science, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 349-375, September.
  10. Nagel, Rosemarie & Bühren, Christoph & Frank, Björn, 2017. "Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 191-207.
  11. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "Bayesian game theorists and non-Bayesian players," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(6), pages 1420-1454, November.
  12. Nobuyuki Hanaki, 2020. "Cognitive ability and observed behavior in laboratory experiments: implications for macroeconomic theory," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 355-378, July.
  13. Kota Murayama, 2020. "Robust predictions under finite depth of reasoning," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 59-84, January.
  14. Berger, Ulrich & De Silva, Hannelore & Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde, 2016. "Cognitive hierarchies in the minimizer game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 337-348.
  15. Wolff, Irenaeus, 2021. "The lottery player’s fallacy: Why labels predict strategic choices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 16-29.
  16. Colin F. Camerer & Gideon Nave & Alec Smith, 2019. "Dynamic Unstructured Bargaining with Private Information: Theory, Experiment, and Outcome Prediction via Machine Learning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1867-1890, April.
  17. Alessandro Sontuoso & Sudeep Bhatia, 2021. "A notion of prominence for games with natural‐language labels," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), pages 283-312, January.
  18. Tong, Hanh T. & Freeman, David J., 2021. "Anchors of strategic reasoning in the traveler’s dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 28-38.
  19. Christoph Engel, 2021. "Crime as Conditional Rule Violation," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2021_20, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  20. Antonio J. Morales & Enrique Fatas, 2021. "Price competition and nominal illusion: experimental evidence and a behavioural model," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 607-632, December.
  21. Wolff, Irenaeus, 2016. "Elicited salience and salience-based level-k," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 134-137.
  22. Irenaeus Wolff, 2017. "Lucky Numbers in Simple Games," TWI Research Paper Series 107, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  23. David Rojo-Arjona & R. Stefania Sitzia & Jiwei Zheng, 2020. "The More The Better! Increasing Label Saliency as a way to Increase Coordination. An Experimental Investigation," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 20-02, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  24. García-Pola, Bernardo, 2020. "Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-k comparison," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 82-104.
  25. Parravano, Melanie & Poulsen, Odile, 2015. "Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 191-199.
  26. Rojo Arjona, David & Sitzia, Stefania & Zheng, Jiwei, 2022. "Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 505-523.
  27. Kota Murayama, 2015. "Robust Predictions under Finite Depth of Reasoning," Discussion Paper Series DP2015-28, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
  28. Marcus Dittrich & Kristina Leipold, 2014. "Gender Differences in Strategic Reasoning," CESifo Working Paper Series 4763, CESifo.
  29. Marco Faillo & Alessandra Smerilli & Robert Sugden, 2016. "Can a single theory explain coordination? An experiment on alternative modes of reasoning and the conditions under which they are used," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  30. Ayala Arad & Benjamin Bachi & Amnon Maltz, 2023. "On the relevance of irrelevant strategies," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(5), pages 1142-1184, November.
  31. Faillo, Marco & Smerilli, Alessandra & Sugden, Robert, 2017. "Bounded best-response and collective-optimality reasoning in coordination games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 317-335.
  32. David Rojo Arjona & Stefania Sitzia & Jiwei Zheng, 2021. "Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points," Working Papers 335109305, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  33. Ireneaus Wolff, 2016. "Elicited Salience and Salience-Based Level-k," TWI Research Paper Series 103, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  34. Jin, Ye, 2022. "Reinvestigating Rk behavior in ring games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
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