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Environmental Pollution: Modeling Occurrence, Detection, and Deterrence

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Vollaard, Ben, 2017. "Temporal displacement of environmental crime: Evidence from marine oil pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 168-180.
  2. Earnhart, Dietrich, 2007. "Effects of permitted effluent limits on environmental compliance levels," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 178-193, February.
  3. Earnhart, Dietrich & Segerson, Kathleen, 2012. "The influence of financial status on the effectiveness of environmental enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 670-684.
  4. Lucija Muehlenbachs & Stefan Staubli & Mark A. Cohen, 2016. "The Impact of Team Inspections on Enforcement and Deterrence," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 159-204.
  5. Chung-Huang Huang, 1996. "Effectiveness of environmental regulations under imperfect enforcement and the firm's avoidance behavior," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(2), pages 183-204, September.
  6. Ayla Ogus, 2005. "A Model of Endogeneous Oil Spill Regulation," Others 0504004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Lamar Pierce & Michael W. Toffel, 2010. "The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring," Harvard Business School Working Papers 11-004, Harvard Business School, revised Feb 2012.
  8. Muehlenbachs, Lucija & Cohen, Mark A. & Gerarden, Todd, 2013. "The impact of water depth on safety and environmental performance in offshore oil and gas production," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 699-705.
  9. Montserrat Grau & Theodore Groves, 1997. "The Oil Spill Process: The Effect of Coast Guard Monitoring on Oil Spills," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 10(4), pages 315-339, December.
  10. Assunção, Juliano & Rocha, Romero, 2019. "Getting greener by going black: the effect of blacklisting municipalities on Amazon deforestation," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(2), pages 115-137, April.
  11. Taiyang Zhong & Xianjin Huang & Lifang Ye & Steffanie Scott, 2014. "The Impacts on Illegal Farmland Conversion of Adopting Remote Sensing Technology for Land Inspection in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 6(7), pages 1-26, July.
  12. Lamar Pierce & Michael W. Toffel, 2013. "The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(5), pages 1558-1584, October.
  13. Dietrich Earnhart, 2004. "Panel Data Analysis of Regulatory Factors Shaping Environmental Performance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(1), pages 391-401, February.
  14. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David, 2006. "Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 110-131, January.
  15. Shigeru Matsumoto & Kenji Takeuchi, 2011. "The effect of community characteristics on the frequency of illegal dumping," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 13(3), pages 177-193, September.
  16. Alm, James & Shimshack, Jay, 2014. "Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: Lessons from Pollution, Safety, and Tax Settings," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 10(4), pages 209-274, December.
  17. Michael W. Toffel, 2008. "Coerced Confessions: Self-Policing in the Shadow of the Regulator," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 45-71, May.
  18. Romero Rocha & Juliano Assunção & Clarissa Gandou, 2014. "Amazon Monitoring And Deforestation Slowdown: The Priority Municipalities," Anais do XLI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 41st Brazilian Economics Meeting] 197, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  19. Talley, Wayne K., 1998. "Determinants of the severity of tanker accidents," Transportation Research Forum Proceedings 1990s 311948, Transportation Research Forum.
  20. maurice moffett & alok k. bohara & kishore gawande, 2005. "Governance and Performance: Theory-Based Evidence from US Coast Guard Inspections," Public Economics 0505002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Kishore Gawande & Alok K. Bohara, 2005. "Agency Problems in Law Enforcement: Theory and Application to the U.S. Coast Guard," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(11), pages 1593-1609, November.
  22. Dietrich Earnhart, 2009. "The influence of facility characteristics and permit conditions on the effectiveness of environmental regulatory deterrence," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 247-273, December.
  23. Matthew Kahn, 2007. "Environmental disasters as risk regulation catalysts? The role of Bhopal, Chernobyl, Exxon Valdez, Love Canal, and Three Mile Island in shaping U.S. environmental law," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 17-43, August.
  24. Robert Innes, 1999. "Self-Policing and Optimal Law Enforcement When Violator Remediation is Valuable," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1305-1325, December.
  25. Ayla Ogus, 2005. "Estimating the Size of Oil Tanker Spills," Others 0504003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  26. Jay P. Shimshack, 2014. "The Economics of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 339-360, October.
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