IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login

Citations for "Yardstick competition and political agency problems"

by Paul Belleflamme & Jean Hindriks

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window

  1. Johannes Rincke, 2009. "Yardstick competition and public sector innovation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 337-361, June.
  2. Hendriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 729, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  3. Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting," Working Papers 2072/151618, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  4. Ruixin Wang & Wendun Wang, 2013. "Dress-up contest: a dark side of fiscal decentralization," Working Papers 2013/30, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  5. Kotsogiannis, Christos & Schwager, Robert, 2008. "Accountability and fiscal equalization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2336-2349, December.
  6. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2006. "Fiscal Equalization and Yardstick Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 1865, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Geys, Benny & Konrad, Kai A., . "Federalism and optimal allocation across levels of governance," Chapters in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  8. Emilie CALDEIRA, 2010. "Yardstick competition in a Federation: Theory and Evidence from China," Working Papers 201018, CERDI.
  9. Snyder Jr., James M. & Ting, Michael M., 2008. "Interest groups and the electoral control of politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 482-500, April.
  10. Antonis Adam & Manthos D. Delis & Pantelis Kammas, 2008. "Fiscal Decentralization and Public Sector Efficiency: Evidence from OECD Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series 2364, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Rincke, Johannes, 2005. "Yardstick Competition and Policy Innovation," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-11, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  12. Timothy Besley & Michael Smart, 2005. "Fiscal Restraints and Voter Welfare," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 06, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  13. Angelino Viceisza, 2007. "An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2007-09, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  14. Abdul Jalil, Ahmad Zafarullah, 2009. "The political economics of the Malaysian subnational governments’ fiscal behavior," MPRA Paper 24988, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. HINDRIKS, Jean, 2004. "Inter-governmental competition: market solutions to political problems," CORE Discussion Papers 2004087, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  16. Finken, Jan, 2009. "Yardstick competition in German municipalities," FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 09-3, University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics.
  17. Cheikbossian, Guillaume & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2008. "Dynamic Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply with Imperfect Monitoring," IDEI Working Papers 527, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  18. Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2005. "Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 329-352, September.
  19. SALMON, Pierre, 2003. "Assigning powers in the European Union in the light of yardstick competition among governments," LEG - Document de travail - Economie 2003-03, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
  20. Galina Zudenkova, 2010. "Split-ticket voting: an implicit incentive approach," Economics Working Papers we1011, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  21. Ivo Bischoff & Frédéric Blaeschke, 2013. "Incentives and Influence Activities in the Public Sector: the Trade-off in Performance Budgeting and Conditional Grants," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201320, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  22. Pablo Querubin & James M. Snyder, Jr., 2011. "The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis: Wealth Accumulation by U.S. Congressmen, 1850-1880," NBER Working Papers 17634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Ivo Bischoff & Frédéric Blaeschke, 2012. "Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201212, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  24. Joanis, Marcelin, 2014. "Shared accountability and partial decentralization in local public good provision," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 28-37.
  25. HINDRIKS, Jean & LOCKWOOD, Ben, 2004. "Centralization and political accountability," CORE Discussion Papers 2004052, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  26. Bischoff, Ivo, 2008. "Conditional Grants, Grant-Seeking and Welfare when there is Government Failure on the Subordinate Level," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-031, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  27. Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Fiscal Decentralization: A Political Economy Perspective," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 721, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  28. Ngo Van Long & Bodhisattva Sengupta, 2008. "Yardstick Competition, Corruption, and Electoral Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 2345, CESifo Group Munich.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.