Yardstick competition and political agency problems
We examine how yardstick competition between jurisdictions affects the agency problem resulting from uncertainty about politicians (adverse selection) and their policies (moral hazard). We find that yardstick comparison can contribute both to disciplining and to selecting politicians. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2005
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Volume (Year): 24 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (09)
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