IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/spr/sochwe/v18y2001i3p601-616.html

The Strong No Show Paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Leonardo Matone & Ben Abramowitz & Ben Armstrong & Avinash Balakrishnan & Nicholas Mattei, 2024. "DeepVoting: Learning and Fine-Tuning Voting Rules with Canonical Embeddings," Papers 2408.13630, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2025.
  2. Brandt, Felix & Geist, Christian & Peters, Dominik, 2017. "Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 18-27.
  3. Wesley H. Holliday & Mikayla Kelley, 2025. "Escaping Arrow’s theorem: the Advantage-Standard model," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 98(2), pages 165-204, March.
  4. Eivind Stensholt, 2013. "What shall we do with the cyclic profile?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 229-262, January.
  5. M. Sanver & William Zwicker, 2012. "Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 371-398, July.
  6. Joaquín Pérez & José L. Jimeno & Estefanía García, 2012. "No Show Paradox in Condorcet k-voting Procedures," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 291-303, May.
  7. Holliday, Wesley H., 2024. "An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
  8. Núñez, Matías & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2017. "Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 9-17.
  9. Brandl, Florian & Brandt, Felix & Hofbauer, Johannes, 2019. "Welfare maximization entices participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 308-314.
  10. Jimeno, José L. & García, Estefanía & Pérez, Joaquín, 2011. "Extensions of the Young and Levenglick result about the inconsistency of Condorcet voting correspondences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 25-27, July.
  11. Conal Duddy, 2014. "Condorcet’s principle and the strong no-show paradoxes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 275-285, August.
  12. Estefanía García & José L. Jimeno & Joaquín Pérez, 2013. "New Voting Correspondences Obtained from a Distance-Based Framework," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 379-388, May.
  13. David McCune & Jennifer Wilson, 2025. "The negative participation paradox in three-candidate instant runoff elections," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 98(4), pages 537-559, June.
  14. Dan S. Felsenthal & Hannu Nurmi, 2016. "Two types of participation failure under nine voting methods in variable electorates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(1), pages 115-135, July.
  15. Nurmi, Hannu, 2005. "Aggregation problems in policy evaluation: an overview," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 287-300, June.
  16. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2026. "An extension of May’s Theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 66(2), pages 395-422, March.
  17. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2023. "Split Cycle: a new Condorcet-consistent voting method independent of clones and immune to spoilers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 1-62, October.
  18. Joaquín Pérez & José L. Jimeno & Estefanía García, 2015. "No Show Paradox and the Golden Number in Generalized Condorcet Voting Methods," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 497-513, May.
  19. Wesley H. Holliday, 2026. "The incompatibility of the Condorcet winner and loser criteria with positive involvement and resolvability," Papers 2601.10506, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
  20. Stefano Vannucci, 2006. "The Proportional Lottery Protocol is Strongly Participatory and VNM-Strategy-Proof," Department of Economics University of Siena 490, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  21. Dan S. Felsenthal & Hannu Nurmi, 2019. "The No-Show Paradox Under a Restricted Domain," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 277-293, April.
  22. Hannu Nurmi & Madeleine O. Hosli, 2003. "Which Decision Rule for the Future Council?," European Union Politics, , vol. 4(1), pages 37-50, March.
  23. Felix Brandt, 2015. "Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 793-804, December.
  24. Yifeng Ding & Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2025. "An axiomatic characterization of Split Cycle," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 64(3), pages 557-601, May.
  25. Brandt, Felix & Dong, Chris & Peters, Dominik, 2025. "Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 113-130.
  26. Guillaume Chèze, 2017. "Topological aggregation, the twin paradox and the No Show paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(4), pages 707-715, April.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.