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Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Hamid Nazerzadeh & Amin Saberi & Rakesh Vohra, 2013. "Dynamic Pay-Per-Action Mechanisms and Applications to Online Advertising," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 61(1), pages 98-111, February.
  2. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso V‰lim‰ki, 2010. "The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 771-789, March.
  4. Yiwei Chen & Vivek F. Farias & Nikolaos Trichakis, 2019. "On the Efficacy of Static Prices for Revenue Management in the Face of Strategic Customers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(12), pages 5535-5555, December.
  5. Hummel, Patrick, 2015. "Simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 269-284.
  6. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
  7. Yiwei Chen & Nikolaos Trichakis, 2021. "Technical Note—On Revenue Management with Strategic Customers Choosing When and What to Buy," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 175-187, January.
  8. Ryuji Sano, 2015. "A Dynamic Mechanism Design for Scheduling with Different Use Lengths," KIER Working Papers 924, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  9. Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000035, David K. Levine.
  10. Sham M. Kakade & Ilan Lobel & Hamid Nazerzadeh, 2013. "Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 61(4), pages 837-854, August.
  11. Yiwei Chen & Vivek F. Farias, 2018. "Robust Dynamic Pricing with Strategic Customers," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 43(4), pages 1119-1142, November.
  12. Daniel F. Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2012. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 879-925.
  13. Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2017. "Calendar mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 252-270.
  14. Hanzhe Zhang, 2021. "Prices versus auctions in large markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(4), pages 1297-1337, November.
  15. Roman Zakharenko, 2020. "Traffic Priority Mechanisms," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(5), pages 1211-1224, September.
  16. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
  17. Jeffrey C. Ely & Daniel F. Garrett & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2017. "Overbooking," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(6), pages 1258-1301.
  18. Deb, Rahul & Said, Maher, 2015. "Dynamic screening with limited commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 891-928.
  19. Simon Board & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2016. "Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1046-1087.
  20. Liu, Heng, 2018. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
  21. Emil Temnyalov, 2019. "Points mechanisms and rewards programs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 436-457, June.
  22. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack, 2018. "Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(5), pages 2031-2046, May.
  23. Salant, David J. & Cabral, Luís, 2019. "Sequential auctions and auction revenue," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 1-4.
  24. Sano, Ryuji, 2021. "Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 465-473.
  25. Tao Zhang & Quanyan Zhu, 2019. "On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design With Exit Option in a Markovian Environment," Papers 1909.13720, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
  26. Joosung Lee & Daniel Z. Li, 2018. "Sequential Search Auctions with a Deadline," Department of Economics Working Papers 2018_03, Durham University, Department of Economics.
  27. Thomas D. Jeitschko & Pallavi Pal, 2021. "Curbing Price Fluctuations in Cap-and-Trade Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 9266, CESifo.
  28. Ryuji Sano, 2017. "A Dynamic Mechanism Design with Overbooking, Different Deadlines, and Multi-unit Demands," KIER Working Papers 963, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  29. Vahab Mirrokni & Renato Paes Leme & Pingzhong Tang & Song Zuo, 2020. "Non‐Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 1939-1963, September.
  30. Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019. "Monotone contracts," Economics Working Papers 1647, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  31. Tao Zhang & Quanyan Zhu, 2022. "On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design With Exit Option in a Markovian Environment," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 701-745, June.
  32. Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2015. "Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 45-76.
  33. Ron Lavi & Ella Segev, 2014. "Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 791-819, November.
  34. Hanzhe Zhang, 2013. "The Optimal Sequence of Costly Mechanisms," Working Papers 2014-005, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
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