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The Revolving Door for Financial Regulators

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Kempf, Elisabeth, 2020. "The job rating game: Revolving doors and analyst incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 41-67.
  2. Antonín Korauš & Ján Dobrovič & Jozef Polák & Stanislav Backa, 2019. "Aspects of the security use of payment card pin code analysed by the methods of multidimensional statistics," Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues, VsI Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Center, vol. 6(4), pages 2017-2036, June.
  3. Ms. Deniz O Igan & Thomas Lambert, 2019. "Bank Lobbying: Regulatory Capture and Beyond," IMF Working Papers 2019/171, International Monetary Fund.
  4. Thomas Ian Schneider & Philip E. Strahan & Jun Yang, 2020. "Bank Stress Testing: Public Interest or Regulatory Capture?," NBER Working Papers 26887, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Prasanna Gai & Sherry X. Wu, 2023. "On Market‐Friendly Central Bankers," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 99(325), pages 238-252, June.
  6. Lim, Ivan & Hagendorff, Jens & Armitage, Seth, 2019. "Is the fox guarding the henhouse? Bankers in the Federal Reserve, bank leverage and risk-shifting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 478-504.
  7. Jagan Krishnan & Jayanthi Krishnan & Steven A. Maex, 2024. "Does audit firm hiring of former PCAOB personnel improve audit quality?," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 3130-3175, December.
  8. Giulia Brancaccio & Karam Kang, 2025. "Search Frictions and Product Design in the Municipal Bond Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 93(6), pages 2159-2199, November.
  9. de C. Griebeler, Marcelo & F. Damo, Alexandre, 2021. "Serving three masters: optimal monetary and regulatory policies when central bankers have career concerns," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 75(3), December.
  10. Zhang, Karen & Truong, Cameron, 2019. "What’s the value of politically connected directors?," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3).
  11. Reint Gropp & Steven Ongena & Jörg Rocholl & Vahid Saadi, 2022. "The cleansing effect of banking crises," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(3), pages 1186-1213, July.
  12. Ivana V. Katic & Jerry W. Kim, 2024. "Caught in the Revolving Door: Firm-Government Employee Mobility as a Fleeting Regulatory Advantage," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(1), pages 281-306, January.
  13. Michelson, Noam, 2023. "The revolving door of former civil servants and firm value: A comprehensive approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
  14. Luechinger, Simon & Moser, Christoph, 2020. "The European Commission and the revolving door," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
  15. Charles-Cadogan, G., 2021. "Market Instability, Investor Sentiment, And Probability Judgment Error in Index Option Prices," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 71, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
  16. Bank for International Settlements, 2025. "Lessons on supervisory effectiveness - a literature review," BCBS Working Papers 45, Bank for International Settlements.
  17. Jonas Heese, 2022. "Does Industry Employment of Active Regulators Weaken Oversight?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(12), pages 9198-9218, December.
  18. Wang, Ping & Wang, Xiaochun & Wu, Jie, 2023. "Executives' regulatory experiences and corporate social responsibility," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(PB).
  19. Thomas Schneider & Philip E Strahan & Jun Yang, 2023. "Bank Stress Testing: Public Interest or Regulatory Capture?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(2), pages 423-467.
  20. Jan Libich & Liam Lenten, 2022. "Hero or villain? The financial system in the 21st century," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 3-40, February.
  21. Claes Axel Belfrage & Markus Kallifatides, 2018. "The politicisation of macroprudential regulation: The critical Swedish case," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 50(3), pages 709-729, May.
  22. Gopalan, Yadav, 2022. "The effects of ratings disclosure by bank regulators," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1).
  23. Thomas Lambert, 2019. "Lobbying on Regulatory Enforcement Actions: Evidence from U.S. Commercial and Savings Banks," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 2545-2572, June.
  24. Shy, Oz & Stenbacka, Rune, 2024. "Lobbying and liquidity requirements: Large versus small banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
  25. Yumin Karen Zhang Perry & Christofer Adrian & Cameron Truong, 2025. "Politically connected audit committee and audit risk: Evidence from a quasi‐experiment," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 65(2), pages 1428-1467, June.
  26. Matteo Cotugno & Antonio D'Amato & Angela Gallo & Valeria Stefanelli, 2021. "Do supervisory enforcement actions affect board composition?," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 22-44, January.
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