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The politicisation of macroprudential regulation: The critical Swedish case

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  • Claes Axel Belfrage
  • Markus Kallifatides

Abstract

This article explores the prospects of stabilising financialisation in Europe as a spatial-temporal fix for Anglo-American capitalism’s crisis-tendencies. We analyse the politics of (countercyclical) macroprudential regulation in the critical case study of Sweden. Here, macroprudential regulation is introduced, in contrast with much of the rest of the EU economies, in a credit boom. We find evidence of an administrative crisis, as technocrats face the political constraints on re-regulating financialised accumulation. This suggests that the conditions are ripe for a deepened administrative crisis in Europe once countercyclical macroprudential regulation is implemented.

Suggested Citation

  • Claes Axel Belfrage & Markus Kallifatides, 2018. "The politicisation of macroprudential regulation: The critical Swedish case," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 50(3), pages 709-729, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:envira:v:50:y:2018:i:3:p:709-729
    DOI: 10.1177/0308518X17750877
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    References listed on IDEAS

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