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Constitutional stability

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Andrea Sáenz de Viteri Vázquez & Christian Bjørnskov, 2020. "Constitutional power concentration and corruption: evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 509-536, December.
  2. Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska & Jacek Lewkowicz, 2021. "Post-socialist “illiberal democracies”: do de jure constitutional rights matter?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 233-265, June.
  3. Tim Schnelle, 2025. "Non-compliance as a determinant of constitutional change? A comparative study," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 376-399, September.
  4. Georg Vanberg, 1998. "Reply to Stone Sweet," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(3), pages 339-346, July.
  5. Kyriacou, Andreas, 2000. "A ‘Just and Lasting Solution’ to the Cyprus Problem: In Search of Institutional Viability," MPRA Paper 116308, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Gabriel L. Negretto & Mariano Sánchez-Talanquer, 2026. "Constitutional renewals: the lineage of democratizing constitutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 207(1), pages 239-259, April.
  7. Pavlik, Jamie Bologna & Jahan, Israt & Young, Andrew T., 2023. "Do longer constitutions corrupt?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
  8. SALMON, Pierre, 1999. "Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangement," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 1999-10, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
  9. Leeson, Peter T. & Suarez, Paola A., 2016. "An economic analysis of Magna Carta," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(S), pages 40-46.
  10. Barry R. Weingast, 2005. "The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic Liberty," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 89-108, Summer.
  11. Alexander William Salter, 2014. "Debt Erosion and the Market Process," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(3), pages 370-378, October.
  12. Andrew T. Young, 2021. "The political economy of feudalism in medieval Europe," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 127-143, March.
  13. Justin Callais & Andrew T. Young, 2021. "Does constitutional entrenchment matter for economic freedom?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(4), pages 808-830, October.
  14. Stefan Voigt, 1996. "Pure eclecticism—The tool kit of the constitutional economist," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 177-196, September.
  15. Jamie Bologna Pavlik & Andrew T. Young, 2023. "Historical Representative Assembly Experiences and Constitutionalism Today," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 65(4), pages 665-680, December.
  16. Paniagua, Victoria & Vogler, Jan P., 2022. "Economic elites and the constitutional design of sharing political power," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 110926, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  17. Knoll Bodo & Koenig Andreas, 2011. "Leviathan Europa – Stärkung der Nationalstaaten und der EU durch konstitutionelle Schranken?," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 60(2), pages 127-145, August.
  18. Andreas Pinkwart & Gideon Schingen & Anna-Tina Pannes & Dirk Schlotböller, 2022. "Improving Resilience in Times of Multiple Crisis," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 763-786, December.
  19. Ndoya, Hermann & Kamguia, Brice & Nchofoung, Tii N., 2024. "Can the constitutional concentration of power be linked to Africa's energy poverty?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
  20. Zachary Elkins, 2021. "Term-limit evasions and the non-compliance cycle," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 326-345, September.
  21. Voigt, Stefan, 2011. "Empirical constitutional economics: Onward and upward?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 319-330.
  22. Alexander Salter, 2015. "Sovereignty as exchange of political property rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 79-96, October.
  23. Young, Andrew T., 2022. "Consent or coordination? assemblies in early medieval Europe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
  24. Justin T. Callais & Andrew T. Young, 2024. "Revolutionary Constitutions: are they revolutionary in terms of constitutional design?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(3), pages 423-455, September.
  25. Schnelle, Tim, 2026. "Crafting compliance – The role of inclusion and participation in constitution-making," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
  26. Victoria Paniagua & Jan P. Vogler, 2022. "Economic elites and the constitutional design of sharing political power," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 25-52, March.
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