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Communications to the Editor--Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Josheski Dushko & Karamazova Elena, 2021. "Auction theory and a note on game mechanisms," Croatian Review of Economic, Business and Social Statistics, Sciendo, vol. 7(1), pages 43-59, May.
  2. Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition," TSE Working Papers 21-1261, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
  3. Rao, Neel, 2015. "General training in labor markets: Common value auctions with unobservable investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 19-45.
  4. Luciano De Castro, 2010. "Affiliation, Equilibrium Existence and Revenue Ranking of Auctions," Discussion Papers 1530, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2003. "Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(489), pages 598-613, July.
  6. Yaron Raviv, 2009. "Uncertainty and Auction Outcomes: Evidence from Used Car Actions," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 34(4), pages 327-347, June.
  7. Ball, Michael O. & Berardino, Frank & Hansen, Mark, 2018. "The use of auctions for allocating airport access rights," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 114(PA), pages 186-202.
  8. Brasil, Eric Universo Rodrigues & Postali, Fernando Antonio Slaibe, 2014. "Informational rents in oil and gas concession auctions in Brazil," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 93-101.
  9. Muhammad Ejaz & Nisho Rani & Muhammad Ramzan Sheikh, 2023. "First Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Bidders’ Heterogeneous Risk Behavior: An Adversarial Risk Analysis Approach," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 231-241, September.
  10. Maarten C.W. Janssen & Santanu Roy, 2023. "Information Uncertainty," Departmental Working Papers 2306, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
  11. Charles A. Holt & Roger Sherman, 2014. "Risk Aversion and the Winner's Curse," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(1), pages 7-22, July.
  12. Gary Stoneham & Vivek Chaudhri & Arthur Ha & Loris Strappazzon, 2003. "Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria's BushTender trial," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 47(4), pages 477-500, December.
  13. Muhammad Ejaz & Stephen Joe & Chaitanya Joshi, 2021. "Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 18(3), pages 185-202, September.
  14. Aleksandar Saša Pekev{c} & Ilia Tsetlin, 2008. "Revenue Ranking of Discriminatory and Uniform Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(9), pages 1610-1623, September.
  15. Alejandro Francetich, 2023. "When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 363-399, June.
  16. Sudip Gupta, 2021. "Strategic Overbidding in Dynamic Auctions: Structural Estimation of Value of Synergy," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(2), pages 584-605, February.
  17. McCannon, Bryan C. & Minuci, Eduardo, 2020. "Shill bidding and trust," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C).
  18. Ronald M. Harstad & Aleksandar Saša Pekeč, 2008. "Relevance to Practice and Auction Theory: A Memorial Essay for Michael Rothkopf," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 38(5), pages 367-380, October.
  19. Vasilis Syrgkanis & David Kempe & Eva Tardos, 2019. "Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 1450-1476, November.
  20. Stoneham, Gary & Chaudhri, Vivek & Ha, Arthur & Strappazzon, Loris, 2002. "Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical Examination of Victoria’s Bush Tender Trial," 2002 Conference (46th), February 13-15, 2002, Canberra, Australia 174043, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
  21. SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2024. "Shill-proof rules in object allocation problems with money," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-137, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
  22. Lundberg, Liv, 2019. "Auctions for all? Reviewing the German wind power auctions in 2017," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 449-458.
  23. Cong Feng & Scott Fay & K. Sivakumar, 2016. "Overbidding in electronic auctions: factors influencing the propensity to overbid and the magnitude of overbidding," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 241-260, March.
  24. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-35, January.
  25. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2020. "Improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2020-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
  26. Cadsby, C. Bram & Du, Ninghua & Wang, Ruqu & Zhang, Jun, 2016. "Goodwill Can Hurt: A theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 224-238.
  27. Paulo Fagandini & Ingemar Dierickx, 2023. "Computing Profit-Maximizing Bid Shading Factors in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 1009-1035, March.
  28. Wei-Shiun Chang & Bo Chen & Timothy C. Salmon, 2015. "An Investigation of the Average Bid Mechanism for Procurement Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(6), pages 1237-1254, June.
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