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Inventors and Impostors: An Economic Analysis of Patent Examination

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  2. Lei, Zhen & Wright, Brian D., 2017. "Why weak patents? Testing the examiner ignorance hypothesis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 43-56.
  3. Schankerman, Mark & Schuett, Florian, 2016. "Screening for Patent Quality," CEPR Discussion Papers 11688, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. François Lafond & Daniel Kim, 2019. "Long-run dynamics of the U.S. patent classification system," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 631-664, April.
  5. Langinier, Corinne & Marcoul, Philippe, 2020. "Monetary and implicit incentives of patent examiners," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
  6. Schankerman, Mark & Schütt, Florian, 2016. "Screening for Patent Quality : Examination, Fees, and the Courts," Other publications TiSEM e9210a8e-ff3b-4f03-823b-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  7. Yoshimi Okada & Yusuke Naito & Sadao Nagaoka, 2018. "Making the patent scope consistent with the invention: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 607-625, September.
  8. Drivas, Kyriakos & Kaplanis, Ioannis, 2020. "The role of international collaborations in securing the patent grant," Journal of Informetrics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4).
  9. Kani, Masayo & Nishimura, Yoichiro, 2025. "Does patent fee reform lower the bar? Evidence from the deferred patent examination system in Japan," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(4).
  10. Koenen, Johannes & Peitz, Martin, 2015. "Firm reputation and incentives to “milk” pending patents," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 18-29.
  11. Niftiyev, Ibrahim, 2021. "Optimal Patent Protection and Expected Utility Model: A Transition Economy Example," EconStor Conference Papers 234512, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
  12. Andrew Eckert & Corinne Langinier, 2014. "A Survey Of The Economics Of Patent Systems And Procedures," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(5), pages 996-1015, December.
  13. Yamauchi, Isamu & Nagaoka, Sadao, 2015. "Does the outsourcing of prior art search increase the efficiency of patent examination? Evidence from Japan," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(8), pages 1601-1614.
  14. Vidya Atal & Talia Bar, 2014. "Patent Quality and a Two-Tiered Patent System," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(3), pages 503-540, September.
  15. Johannes Koenen & Martin Peitz, 2012. "The Economics of Pending Patents," Chapters, in: Joseph E. Harrington Jr & Yannis Katsoulacos (ed.), Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  16. deGrazia, Charles A.W. & Pairolero, Nicholas A. & Teodorescu, Mike H.M., 2021. "Examination incentives, learning, and patent office outcomes: The use of examiner’s amendments at the USPTO," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(10).
  17. Valentin J. Schmitt, 2025. "Disentangling patent quality: using a large language model for a systematic literature review," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 130(1), pages 267-311, January.
  18. JaeYeon Sim & Kyungmyung Jang, 2023. "Blockchain innovation and firm’s financial performance: patent analysis based on firm-level information," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 55(60), pages 7178-7193, December.
  19. Gaétan de Rassenfosse & William E. Griffiths & Adam B. Jaffe & Elizabeth Webster, 2021. "Low-Quality Patents in the Eye of the Beholder: Evidence from Multiple Examiners," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(3), pages 607-636.
  20. Yoshimi OKADA & Yusuke NAITO & Sadao NAGAOKA, 2016. "Contribution of Patent Examination to Making the Patent Scope Consistent with the Invention: Evidence from Japan," Discussion papers 16092, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  21. Florian Schuett, 2013. "Inventors and Impostors: An Analysis of Patent Examination with Self-Selection of Firms into R&D," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 660-699, September.
  22. Corinne Langinier & Philippe Marcoul, 2019. "Subjective performance of patent examiners, implicit contracts, and self‐funded patent offices," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 40(3), pages 251-266, April.
  23. Kristie Briggs & Mary Wade, 2014. "More is better: evidence that joint patenting leads to quality innovation," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(35), pages 4370-4379, December.
  24. Marco, Alan C. & Sarnoff, Joshua D. & deGrazia, Charles A.W., 2019. "Patent claims and patent scope," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(9), pages 1-1.
  25. Régibeau, P & Rockett, K & Mariam, S, 2012. "Patent Pendency, Learning Effects, and Innovation Importance at the US Patent Office," Economics Discussion Papers 2863, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  26. Kim, Yee Kyoung & Oh, Jun Byoung, 2017. "Examination workloads, grant decision bias and examination quality of patent office," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 1005-1019.
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