IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jemstr/v27y2018i3p607-625.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Making the patent scope consistent with the invention: Evidence from Japan

Author

Listed:
  • Yoshimi Okada
  • Yusuke Naito
  • Sadao Nagaoka

Abstract

It is a crucial function of patent examination to make the patent scope consistent with the contribution of the invention to the state of the art. We assess this function using newly developed data on the scope of Japanese patent applications and grants. We find that the scope was narrowed in two thirds of the grants, both the incidence and the extent of narrowing increased when the applicant chose broad initial scope and decreased when the quality of the applicant's disclosure of prior art was high, and that important applications experienced narrowing more frequently, as one expects from rational examination.

Suggested Citation

  • Yoshimi Okada & Yusuke Naito & Sadao Nagaoka, 2018. "Making the patent scope consistent with the invention: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 607-625, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:27:y:2018:i:3:p:607-625
    DOI: 10.1111/jems.12266
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12266
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/jems.12266?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, 2005. "Probabilistic Patents," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 75-98, Spring.
    2. Goto, Akira & Motohashi, Kazuyuki, 2007. "Construction of a Japanese Patent Database and a first look at Japanese patenting activities," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 1431-1442, November.
    3. Florian Schuett, 2013. "Patent quality and incentives at the patent office," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(2), pages 313-336, June.
    4. Elizabeth Webster & Paul H. Jensen & Alfons Palangkaraya, 2014. "Patent examination outcomes and the national treatment principle," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(2), pages 449-469, June.
    5. Lee Fleming, 2001. "Recombinant Uncertainty in Technological Search," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(1), pages 117-132, January.
    6. Bhaven N. Sampat, 2010. "When Do Applicants Search for Prior Art?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 399-416, May.
    7. Verhoeven, Dennis & Bakker, Jurriën & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 2016. "Measuring technological novelty with patent-based indicators," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 707-723.
    8. Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), 2010. "Handbook of the Economics of Innovation," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    9. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 2008. "How Strong Are Weak Patents?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1347-1369, September.
    10. Joshua Lerner, 1994. "The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(2), pages 319-333, Summer.
    11. Nagaoka, Sadao & Motohashi, Kazuyuki & Goto, Akira, 2010. "Patent Statistics as an Innovation Indicator," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1083-1127, Elsevier.
    12. Cotropia, Christopher A. & Lemley, Mark A. & Sampat, Bhaven, 2013. "Do applicant patent citations matter?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 844-854.
    13. Dietmar Harhoff, 2016. "Patent Quality and Examination in Europe," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 193-197, May.
    14. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, 2008. "Introduction to Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk," Introductory Chapters, in: Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk, Princeton University Press.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Masami Imai & Michiru Sawada, 2022. "Does a Financial Crisis Impair Corporate Innovation?," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2022-002, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
    2. Appio, Francesco Paolo & Baglieri, Daniela & Cesaroni, Fabrizio & Spicuzza, Lucia & Donato, Alessia, 2022. "Patent design strategies: Empirical evidence from European patents," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).
    3. Haoyang Song & Jianhua Hou & Yang Zhang, 2022. "Patent protection: does it promote or inhibit the patented technological knowledge diffusion?," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 127(5), pages 2351-2379, May.
    4. Higham, Kyle & Contisciani, Martina & De Bacco, Caterina, 2022. "Multilayer patent citation networks: A comprehensive analytical framework for studying explicit technological relationships," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    5. Beladi, Hamid & Hou, Qingsong & Hu, May, 2022. "The party school education and corporate innovation: Evidence from SOEs in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrew Eckert & Corinne Langinier, 2014. "A Survey Of The Economics Of Patent Systems And Procedures," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(5), pages 996-1015, December.
    2. OKADA Yoshimi & NAITO Yusuke & NAGAOKA Sadao, 2016. "Contribution of Patent Examination to Making the Patent Scope Consistent with the Invention: Evidence from Japan," Discussion papers 16092, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    3. Lei, Zhen & Wright, Brian D., 2017. "Why weak patents? Testing the examiner ignorance hypothesis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 43-56.
    4. Bekkers, Rudi & Martinelli, Arianna & Tamagni, Federico, 2020. "The impact of including standards-related documentation in patent prior art: Evidence from an EPO policy change," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(7).
    5. NAGAOKA Sadao & YAMAUCHI Isamu, 2017. "Information Constraint of the Patent Office and Examination Quality: Evidence from the effects of initiation lags," Discussion papers 17040, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    6. Kwon, Seokbeom, 2021. "The prevalence of weak patents in the United States: A new method to identify weak patents and the implications for patent policy," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    7. deGrazia, Charles A.W. & Pairolero, Nicholas A. & Teodorescu, Mike H.M., 2021. "Examination incentives, learning, and patent office outcomes: The use of examiner’s amendments at the USPTO," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(10).
    8. Krzysztof Klincewicz & Szymon Szumiał, 2022. "Successful patenting—not only how, but with whom: the importance of patent attorneys," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 127(9), pages 5111-5137, September.
    9. Gaétan de Rassenfosse & William E. Griffiths & Adam B. Jaffe & Elizabeth Webster, 2021. "Low-Quality Patents in the Eye of the Beholder: Evidence from Multiple Examiners," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(3), pages 607-636.
    10. Martin Kalthaus, 2020. "Knowledge recombination along the technology life cycle," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 643-704, July.
    11. Drivas, Kyriakos & Kaplanis, Ioannis, 2020. "The role of international collaborations in securing the patent grant," Journal of Informetrics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4).
    12. Zhu, Kejia & Malhotra, Shavin & Li, Yaohan, 2022. "Technological diversity of patent applications and decision pendency," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(1).
    13. Nagaoka, Sadao & Yamauchi, Isamu, 2022. "Information constraints and examination quality in patent offices: The effect of initiation lags," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    14. Corinne Langinier & Stéphanie Lluis, 2021. "Departure And Promotion Of U.S. Patent Examiners: Do Patent Characteristics Matter?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(2), pages 416-434, April.
    15. Langinier, Corinne & Marcoul, Philippe, 2020. "Monetary and implicit incentives of patent examiners," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    16. Yamauchi, Isamu & Nagaoka, Sadao, 2015. "Does the outsourcing of prior art search increase the efficiency of patent examination? Evidence from Japan," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(8), pages 1601-1614.
    17. Schankerman, Mark & Schuett, Florian, 2016. "Screening for Patent Quality," CEPR Discussion Papers 11688, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Jörn Block & Christian Fisch & Kenta Ikeuchi & Masatoshi Kato, 2022. "Trademarks as an indicator of regional innovation: evidence from Japanese prefectures," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(2), pages 190-209, February.
    19. Manuel Acosta & Daniel Coronado & Esther Ferrándiz & Manuel Jiménez, 2022. "Effects of knowledge spillovers between competitors on patent quality: what patent citations reveal about a global duopoly," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 47(5), pages 1451-1487, October.
    20. Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Adam B. Jaffe, 2018. "Are patent fees effective at weeding out low‐quality patents?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 134-148, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:27:y:2018:i:3:p:607-625. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.