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The Condorcet criterion and committee selection

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016. "Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 97-116, October.
  2. Barberà, Salvador & Coelho, Danilo, 2017. "Balancing the power to appoint officers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 189-203.
  3. Haris Aziz & Barton E. Lee, 2020. "The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(1), pages 1-45, January.
  4. Jean-François Laslier & Karine Straeten, 2016. "Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 559-587, October.
  5. Eric Kamwa, 2017. "Stable Rules for Electing Committees and Divergence on Outcomes," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 547-564, May.
  6. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2008. "How to choose a non-controversial list with k names," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 79-96, June.
  7. David McCune & Erin Martin & Grant Latina & Kaitlyn Simms, 2023. "A Comparison of Sequential Ranked-Choice Voting and Single Transferable Vote," Papers 2306.17341, arXiv.org.
  8. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2018. "The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency," Working Papers hal-01757761, HAL.
  9. Daniela Bubboloni & Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori, 2020. "Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 151-185, April.
  10. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2020. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Post-Print hal-02424936, HAL.
  11. Joaquín Pérez & José L. Jimeno & Estefanía García, 2012. "No Show Paradox in Condorcet k-voting Procedures," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 291-303, May.
  12. Diss, Mostapha & Mahajne, Muhammad, 2020. "Social acceptability of Condorcet committees," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 14-27.
  13. Edith Elkind & Piotr Faliszewski & Piotr Skowron & Arkadii Slinko, 2017. "Properties of multiwinner voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 599-632, March.
  14. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2006. "How to choose a non-controversial list with k names," Working Papers 291, Barcelona School of Economics.
  15. David McCune & Adam Graham-Squire, 2024. "Monotonicity anomalies in Scottish local government elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(1), pages 69-101, August.
  16. Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi & Issofa Moyouwou, 2023. "Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 489-510, October.
  17. Jimeno, José L. & García, Estefanía & Pérez, Joaquín, 2011. "Extensions of the Young and Levenglick result about the inconsistency of Condorcet voting correspondences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 25-27, July.
  18. Egor Ianovski, 2022. "Electing a committee with dominance constraints," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 985-1000, November.
  19. Edith Elkind & Jérôme Lang & Abdallah Saffidine, 2015. "Condorcet winning sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 493-517, March.
  20. Aziz, Haris & Lee, Barton E., 2022. "A characterization of proportionally representative committees," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 248-255.
  21. Adam Graham-Squire & David McCune, 2023. "Paradoxical Oddities in Two Multiwinner Elections from Scotland," Papers 2305.20078, arXiv.org.
  22. Fujun Hou, 2024. "A new social welfare function with a number of desirable properties," Papers 2403.16373, arXiv.org.
  23. Davide Grossi, 2021. "Lecture Notes on Voting Theory," Papers 2105.00216, arXiv.org.
  24. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020. "On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(5), pages 699-725.
  25. Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2023. "Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 469-469, June.
  26. Darmann, Andreas, 2018. "A social choice approach to ordinal group activity selection," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 57-66.
  27. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2019. "On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle," Working Papers hal-02147735, HAL.
  28. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 2000. "The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 191-197, February.
  29. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2019. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Working Papers hal-02424936, HAL.
  30. Issofa Moyouwou & Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi, 2023. "Combining diversity and excellence in multiwinner elections," Working Papers halshs-04221668, HAL.
  31. Jean-François Laslier & Karine van Der Straeten, 2015. "Strategic Voting under Committee Approval: A Theory," PSE Working Papers halshs-01168767, HAL.
  32. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2004. "On the rule of K names," Working Papers 264, Barcelona School of Economics.
  33. Gassi, Clinton Gubong & Steffen, Frank, 2025. "Multi-winner rules analogous to the Plurality rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
  34. Barberà, Salvador & Coelho, Danilo, 2010. "On the rule of k names," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 44-61, September.
  35. Andreas Darmann, 2016. "It is difficult to tell if there is a Condorcet spanning tree," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 84(1), pages 93-104, August.
  36. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01304688 is not listed on IDEAS
  37. Dan Felsenthal & Nicolaus Tideman, 2014. "Weak Condorcet winner(s) revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 313-326, September.
  38. Eric Kamwa, 2013. "The Kemeny rule and committees elections," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 648-654.
  39. Clinton Gubong Gassi & Frank Steffen, 2024. "Multi-winner rules analogous to the Plurality rule," Working Papers 2024-18, CRESE.
  40. David McCune & Erin Martin & Grant Latina & Kaitlyn Simms, 2024. "A comparison of sequential ranked-choice voting and single transferable vote," Journal of Computational Social Science, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 643-670, April.
  41. Eric Kamwa & Vincent Merlin, 2018. "Coincidence of Condorcet committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(1), pages 171-189, January.
  42. Suzuki, Takahiro & Horita, Masahide, 2024. "Which set of agents plays a key role? An impossibility in transforming binary relations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 12-19.
  43. Darmann, Andreas, 2013. "How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 282-292.
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