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The Kemeny rule and committees elections

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  • Eric Kamwa

    () (Economie publique et choix social - CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

An adaptation of the Kemeny rule (Kemeny 1959) was proposed by Ratliff (2003) for committees elections. A Committee is a fixed-size subset of candidates. Ratliff (2003) showed that the elected committee under the rule he proposed is not always made of the top candidates of the Kemeny ranking. We show that when restricting the frame to three-candidate elections, the elected committee of two candidates is always made of the two top candidates of the Kemeny ranking.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Kamwa, 2013. "The Kemeny rule and committees elections," Post-Print halshs-00865742, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00865742
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00865742
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peyton Young, 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 51-64, Winter.
    2. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2008. "How to choose a non-controversial list with k names," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 79-96, June.
    3. I. Good, 1971. "A note on condorcet sets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 97-101, March.
    4. Gehrlein, William V., 1985. "The Condorcet criterion and committee selection," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 199-209, December.
    5. Thomas C. Ratliff, 2003. "Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(3), pages 433-454, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eric Kamwa, 2017. "Stable Rules for Electing Committees and Divergence on Outcomes," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 547-564, May.
    2. repec:eee:mateco:v:70:y:2017:i:c:p:36-44 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Kamwa, Eric, 2017. "On stable rules for selecting committees," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 36-44.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ratliff; Kemeny; committee; Condorcet committee; ranking; ratliff.;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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