The Kemeny rule and committees elections
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References listed on IDEAS
- Peyton Young, 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 51-64, Winter.
- Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2008.
"How to choose a non-controversial list with k names,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 79-96, June.
- Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2006. "How to choose a non-controversial list with k names," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 675.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2006. "How to choose a non-controversial list with k names," Working Papers 291, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- I. Good, 1971. "A note on condorcet sets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 97-101, March.
- Gehrlein, William V., 1985. "The Condorcet criterion and committee selection," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 199-209, December.
- Thomas C. Ratliff, 2003. "Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(3), pages 433-454, December.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Eric Kamwa, 2017.
"Stable Rules for Electing Committees and Divergence on Outcomes,"
Group Decision and Negotiation,
Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 547-564, May.
- Eric Kamwa, 0. "Stable Rules for Electing Committees and Divergence on Outcomes," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-18.
- Eric Kamwa, 2017. "Stable Rules for Electing Committees and Divergence on Outcomes," Post-Print hal-01631174, HAL.
- repec:eee:mateco:v:70:y:2017:i:c:p:36-44 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kamwa, Eric, 2017. "On stable rules for selecting committees," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 36-44.
More about this item
Keywordsratliff; Kemeny; committee; Condorcet committee; ranking; ratliff.;
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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