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The Kemeny rule and committees elections

Listed author(s):
  • Eric Kamwa

    ()

    (Economie publique et choix social - CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

An adaptation of the Kemeny rule (Kemeny 1959) was proposed by Ratliff (2003) for committees elections. A Committee is a fixed-size subset of candidates. Ratliff (2003) showed that the elected committee under the rule he proposed is not always made of the top candidates of the Kemeny ranking. We show that when restricting the frame to three-candidate elections, the elected committee of two candidates is always made of the two top candidates of the Kemeny ranking.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00865742.

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Length:
Date of creation: 2013
Publication status: Published in Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, 2013, 33 (1), pp.648-654
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00865742
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00865742
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  1. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2008. "How to choose a non-controversial list with k names," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 79-96, June.
  2. Gehrlein, William V., 1985. "The Condorcet criterion and committee selection," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 199-209, December.
  3. Thomas C. Ratliff, 2003. "Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(3), pages 433-454, December.
  4. Peyton Young, 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 51-64, Winter.
  5. I. Good, 1971. "A note on condorcet sets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 97-101, March.
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