The Kemeny rule and committees elections
An adaptation of the Kemeny rule (Kemeny 1959) was proposed by Ratliff (2003) for committees elections. A Committee is a fixed-size subset of candidates. Ratliff (2003) showed that the elected committee under the rule he proposed is not always made of the top candidates of the Kemeny ranking. We show that when restricting the frame to three-candidate elections, the elected committee of two candidates is always made of the two top candidates of the Kemeny ranking.
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|Date of creation:||2013|
|Publication status:||Published in Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, 2013, 33 (1), pp.648-654|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00865742|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
References listed on IDEAS
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- Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2008.
"How to choose a non-controversial list with k names,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 79-96, June.
- Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2006. "How to choose a non-controversial list with k names," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 675.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2006. "How to choose a non-controversial list with k names," Working Papers 291, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Gehrlein, William V., 1985. "The Condorcet criterion and committee selection," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 199-209, December.
- Thomas C. Ratliff, 2003. "Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(3), pages 433-454, December.
- Peyton Young, 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 51-64, Winter.
- I. Good, 1971. "A note on condorcet sets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 97-101, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)