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Multi-winner rules analogous to the Plurality rule

Author

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  • Gassi, Clinton Gubong
  • Steffen, Frank

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to identify the multi-winner voting rules that can be considered as extensions of the Plurality rule when voters’ preferences are expressed as linear rankings over the candidates. Multi-winner voting addresses the problem of selecting a fixed-size subset of candidates, called a committee, from a larger set of available candidates based on the voters’ preferences. In the single-winner setting, where each voter provides a strict ranking of the candidates and the goal is to select a unique candidate, Yeh (2008) characterized the Plurality rule as the only voting rule satisfying five independent axioms: anonymity, neutrality, consistency, efficiency, and top-only. In this paper, we demonstrate that a natural extension of these axioms to the multi-winner framework allows us to identify a class of top-kcounting rules as multi-winner analogous to the Plurality rule, that does not contain the classical k-Plurality rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Gassi, Clinton Gubong & Steffen, Frank, 2025. "Multi-winner rules analogous to the Plurality rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:135:y:2025:i:c:s0165489625000204
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102405
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    Keywords

    Multi-winner; Voting rules; Axioms; Plurality rule; Top-k counting rules;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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