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The Role of Inferences in Sequential Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information: Some Experimental Evidence

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Cited by:

  1. Lee, Chin-Chong & Ng, Sin-Huei & Khong, Roy W.L., 2024. "Subscription price discounts of stock warrants and cost of potential ownership dilution," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 96(PB).
  2. Stefan Kohler, 2012. "Incomplete Information about Social Preferences Explains Equal Division and Delay in Bargaining," Games, MDPI, vol. 3(3), pages 1-19, September.
  3. Hales, Jeffrey, 2009. "Are investors really willing to agree to disagree? An experimental investigation of how disagreement and attention to disagreement affect trading behavior," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 230-241, March.
  4. Vismara, Silvio, 2019. "Sustainability in equity crowdfunding," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 98-106.
  5. Douthit, Jeremy D. & Kachelmeier, Steven J. & Van Landuyt, Ben W., 2024. "Does auditor assurance of client prosocial activities affect subsequent reporter-auditor negotiations?," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
  6. Valenzuela, Ana & Srivastava, Joydeep & Lee, Seonsu, 2005. "The role of cultural orientation in bargaining under incomplete information: Differences in causal attributions," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 72-88, January.
  7. Taj, Saud A., 2016. "Application of signaling theory in management research: Addressing major gaps in theory," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 338-348.
  8. Ekaterina S. Bjornali & Ferran Giones & Anders Billstrom, 2017. "Reveal or Conceal? Signaling Strategies for Building Legitimacy in Cleantech Firms," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(10), pages 1-19, October.
  9. Alina Grecu & Wolfgang Sofka & Marcus M. Larsen & Torben Pedersen, 2022. "Unintended signals: Why companies with a history of offshoring have to pay wage penalties for new hires," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 53(3), pages 534-549, April.
  10. Carolin Baier & Max Göttsche & Andreas Hellmann & Frank Schiemann, 2022. "Too Good To Be True: Influencing Credibility Perceptions with Signaling Reference Explicitness and Assurance Depth," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 178(3), pages 695-714, July.
  11. Galli, Davide & Torelli, Riccardo & Tibiletti, Veronica, 2021. "Signaling the Adoption of the Benefit Corporation Model: A Step towards Transparency," OSF Preprints ar28u, Center for Open Science.
  12. Jörn Block & Lars Hornuf & Alexandra Moritz, 2018. "Which updates during an equity crowdfunding campaign increase crowd participation?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 3-27, January.
  13. Colin F. Camerer & Gideon Nave & Alec Smith, 2019. "Dynamic Unstructured Bargaining with Private Information: Theory, Experiment, and Outcome Prediction via Machine Learning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1867-1890, April.
  14. Ho, Violet T. & Kong, Dejun Tony, 2015. "Exploring the signaling function of idiosyncratic deals and their interaction," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 149-161.
  15. Xiangyang Xu & Joanna Horabik & Zbigniew Nahorski, 2014. "Pricing of uncertain certified emission reductions in a Chinese coal mine methane project with an extended Rubinstein-Ståhl model," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 617-632, June.
  16. Davide Galli & Riccardo Torelli & Veronica Tibiletti, 2021. "Signaling the Adoption of the Benefit Corporation Model: A Step towards Transparency," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(12), pages 1-16, June.
  17. Dongkyu Chang & Duk Gyoo Kim & Wooyoung Lim, 2022. "Positive and Negative Selection in Bargaining: An Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 9908, CESifo.
  18. Ponce de Leon, Rebecca & Carter, James T. & Rosette, Ashleigh Shelby, 2024. "Sincere solidarity or performative pretense? Evaluations of organizational allyship," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
  19. Horner, Sam & Papageorgiadis, Nikolaos & Sofka, Wolfgang & Angelidou, Sofia, 2022. "Standing your ground: Examining the signaling effects of patent litigation in university technology licensing," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(10).
  20. Yaokuang Li & Li Ling & Daru Zhang & Juan Wu, 2021. "Lead investors and information disclosure: A test of signaling theory by fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis approach," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(4), pages 836-849, June.
  21. Conte, Francesca & Sardanelli, Domenico & Vollero, Agostino & Siano, Alfonso, 2023. "CSR signaling in controversial and noncontroversial industries: CSR policies, governance structures, and transparency tools," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 274-281.
  22. Jack Fanning & Andrew Kloosterman, 2022. "An experimental test of the Coase conjecture: Fairness in dynamic bargaining," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 138-165, March.
  23. repec:osf:osfxxx:ar28u_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Tong Che & Zeyu Peng & Zhongsheng Hua, 2016. "Characteristics of online group-buying website and consumers intention to revisit: the moderating effects of visit channels," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 171-188, June.
  25. Oza, Shweta S. & Srivastava, Joydeep & Koukova, Nevena T., 2010. "How suspicion mitigates the effect of influence tactics," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 1-10, May.
  26. Fanning, Jack, 2022. "Fairness and the Coase conjecture," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
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