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Optimal non-linear health insurance

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Bardey, David & Buitrago, Giancarlo, 2017. "Supplemental health insurance in the Colombian managed care system: Adverse or advantageous selection?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 317-329.
  2. Ed Westerhout & Kees Folmer, 2007. "Co-payment systems in health care; between moral hazard and risk reduction," CPB Discussion Paper 78.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  3. Flores, Gabriela & O’Donnell, Owen, 2016. "Catastrophic medical expenditure risk," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 1-15.
  4. Jin Feng & Zheng Song, 2009. "Health care system in rural China: A quantitative approach based on heterogeneous individuals," Frontiers of Economics in China, Springer;Higher Education Press, vol. 4(2), pages 153-172, June.
  5. Pierre-Yves Geoffard, 2012. "Incentive and Selection Effects in Health Insurance," Chapters, in: Andrew M. Jones (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  6. Boone, Jan, 2015. "Basic versus supplementary health insurance: Moral hazard and adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 50-58.
  7. Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018. "On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 43(2), pages 137-185, September.
  8. Galina Besstremyannaya & Sergei Golovan, 2019. "Physician’s altruism in incentive contracts: Medicare’s quality race," CINCH Working Paper Series 1903, Universitaet Duisburg-Essen, Competent in Competition and Health.
  9. Justina Klimaviciute & Pierre Pestieau, 2020. "Insurance with a deductible: a way out of the long term care insurance puzzle," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 297-307, August.
  10. Patrick Bajari & Han Hong & Ahmed Khwaja, 2006. "Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis," NBER Working Papers 12445, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Jianmei Zhao & Hai Zhong, 2015. "Medical expenditure in urban China: a quantile regression analysis," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 387-406, December.
  12. Jung, Juergen & Tran, Chung, 2022. "Social health insurance: A quantitative exploration," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
  13. Liliana Chicaíza & Fredy Rodríguez & Mario García, 2006. "La equidad del mecanismo de pago por uso de servicios en el sistema de aseguramiento en salud de Colombia," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 8(15), pages 269-289, July-Dece.
  14. Boone, J., 2014. "Basic Versus Supplementary Health Insurance : Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Other publications TiSEM 6bf0e55c-e004-4c9e-8065-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  15. Wouterse, B.; & Hussem, A.; & Wong, A.;, 2018. "The effect of co-payments in Long Term Care on the distribution of payments,consumption, and risk," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 18/24, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
  16. Anlauf, Markus & Wigger, Berthold U., 1999. "Health insurance and consumer welfare : The case of monopolistic drug markets," Discussion Papers 565, Institut fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Abteilung fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre.
  17. Bardey, David & Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie, 2016. "The design of insurance coverage for medical products under imperfect competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 28-37.
  18. Jacques Drèze & Erik Schokkaert, 2013. "Arrow’s theorem of the deductible: Moral hazard and stop-loss in health insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 147-163, October.
  19. Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2017. "On the Design of Optimal Health Insurance Contracts under Ex Post Moral Hazard," Working Papers hal-01348551, HAL.
  20. Ed Westerhout & Kees Folmer, 2013. "Why it may hurt to be insured: the effects of capping coinsurance payments," CPB Discussion Paper 239, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  21. Wigger, Berthold U. & Anlauf, Markus, 2002. "Moral Hazard, Market Power, and Second Best Health Insurance," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-06, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  22. Ibrahim ALMAASHI, 2014. "A Well-Funded Public Health System For A Healthy National Economy," SEA - Practical Application of Science, Romanian Foundation for Business Intelligence, Editorial Department, issue 5, pages 107-116, November.
  23. Svetlana Pashchenko & Ponpoje Porapakkarm, 2019. "Reducing Medical Spending of the Publicly Insured: The Case for a Cash-out Option," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 390-426, August.
  24. Richard Dusansky & Çağatay Koç, 2016. "Individual Welfare When Consumers Can Shop For Health Insurance," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(2), pages 1283-1290, April.
  25. Francesca Barigozzi, 2006. "Price vs. quantity in health insurance reimbursement," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 191-213, September.
  26. Felder, Stefan, 2008. "To wait or to pay for medical treatment? Restraining ex-post moral hazard in health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 1418-1422, December.
  27. Ellis, Randall P. & Jiang, Shenyi & Manning, Willard G., 2015. "Optimal health insurance for multiple goods and time periods," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 89-106.
  28. Boone, J., 2014. "Basic Versus Supplementary Health Insurance : Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Other publications TiSEM 8ad45428-2ab4-406f-bbd3-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  29. Blomqvist, A. & Johansson, P-O., 1997. "Economic efficiency and mixed public/private insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 505-516, December.
  30. F. Barigozzi, 2003. "Prices vs. Quantities in Health Insurance Reimbursement," Working Papers 499, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  31. Bram Wouterse & Arjen Hussem, 2019. "The welfare effects of co-payments in long term care," CPB Discussion Paper 394, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  32. Lim, Terence & Lo, Andrew W. & Merton, Robert C. & Scholes, Myron S., 2006. "The Derivatives Sourcebook," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 1(5–6), pages 365-572, April.
  33. Kanellopoulos Dimitros, 2011. "A Sustainable Health Care System Requires Management Transformation," Annals - Economy Series, Constantin Brancusi University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 4, pages 112-115, December.
  34. Alex Hoagland & David M. Anderson & Ed Zhu, 2022. "Medical Bill Shock and Imperfect Moral Hazard," Papers 2211.01116, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
  35. Koc, Cagatay, 2004. "A theoretical rationale for an inelastic demand for health care," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 9-14, January.
  36. Ellis, Randall P. & Manning, Willard G., 2007. "Optimal health insurance for prevention and treatment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1128-1150, December.
  37. Reza Yaesoubi & Stephen Roberts, 2010. "A game-theoretic framework for estimating a health purchaser’s willingness-to-pay for health and for expansion," Health Care Management Science, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 358-377, December.
  38. Cutler, David M. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2000. "The anatomy of health insurance," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 563-643, Elsevier.
  39. Westerhout, Ed & Folmer, Kees, 2018. "The Effects of Capping Co-Insurance Payments," Discussion Paper 2018-050, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  40. Petretto, Alessandro, 1999. "Optimal social health insurance with supplementary private insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 727-745, December.
  41. Peng Yang & Zhiping Chen, 2023. "Optimal Private Health Insurance Contract towards the Joint Interests of a Policyholder and an Insurer," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(10), pages 1-28, May.
  42. Matthias Wrede, 2005. "Health Values, Preference Inconsistency, and Insurance Demand," CESifo Working Paper Series 1634, CESifo.
  43. Richard Dusansky & Çağatay Koç, 2010. "Implications of the Interaction Between Insurance Choice and Medical Care Demand," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 129-144, March.
  44. Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Pestieau, Pierre, 2016. "The design of long term care insurance contracts," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 330-339.
  45. M. Martin Boyer & Pierre-Thomas Léger, 2001. "Inflation as a Strategic Response," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-26, CIRANO.
  46. Sidorenko, Alexandra, 2001. "Stochastic Model of Demand for Medical Care with Endogenous Labour Supply and Health Insurance," Departmental Working Papers 2001-08, The Australian National University, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics.
  47. Ed Westerhout & Kees Folmer, 2007. "Co-payment systems in health care; between moral hazard and risk reduction," CPB Discussion Paper 78, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  48. Westerhout, Ed & Folmer, Kees, 2018. "The Effects of Capping Co-Insurance Payments," Other publications TiSEM 828746fb-4fb0-465b-bdff-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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