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A model of dynamic compensation and capital structure

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Cited by:

  1. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2013. "Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(10), pages 2620-2647.
  2. Pegoraro, Stefano, 2024. "Risk aversion with nothing to lose," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
  3. Nengjiu Ju & Xuhu Wan, 2012. "Optimal Compensation and Pay-Performance Sensitivity in a Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(3), pages 641-657, March.
  4. Zhiguo He & Bin Wei & Jianfeng Yu & Feng Gao, 2017. "Optimal Long-Term Contracting with Learning," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(6), pages 2006-2065.
  5. Gan, Liu & Xia, Xin, 2019. "Idiosyncratic risk, managerial discretion and capital structure," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 586-599.
  6. Karpavičius, Sigitas, 2014. "The cost of capital and optimal financing policy in a dynamic setting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 42-56.
  7. Mayer, Simon, 2022. "Financing breakthroughs under failure risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 807-848.
  8. Cetemen, Doruk & Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Urgun, Can, 2023. "Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: Contracting with non-exponential discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
  9. Jianjun Miao & Alejandro Rivera, 2016. "Robust Contracts in Continuous Time," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1405-1440, July.
  10. de La Bruslerie, Hubert & Gueguen, Simon, 2021. "Creditors’ holdup, releveraging and the setting of private appropriation in a control contract between shareholders," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
  11. Peng, Juan & Huang, Wenli & Gao, Han & Wang, Hongli, 2022. "Modeling the unintended consequences of short selling for innovation investment," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
  12. Douglas W. Diamond & Zhiguo He, 2014. "A Theory of Debt Maturity: The Long and Short of Debt Overhang," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(2), pages 719-762, April.
  13. Niu, Huawei & Hua, Wei, 2019. "An endogenous structural credit risk model incorporating with moral hazard and rollover risk," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 47-59.
  14. Zhiguo He & Wei Xiong, 2012. "Rollover Risk and Credit Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(2), pages 391-430, April.
  15. Leonardo Becchetti & Nazaria Solferino & Maria Elisabetta Tessitore, 2016. "Corporate social responsibility and profit volatility: theory and empirical evidence," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 25(1), pages 49-89.
  16. Tan, Lihua & Yang, Zhaojun, 2024. "Simple contracts with double-sided moral hazard and adverse selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
  17. Sharjil M. Haque, 2023. "Does Private Equity Over-Lever Portfolio Companies?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2023-009, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  18. Yang, Bo & Gan, Liu & Wen, Chunhui, 2021. "Moral hazard, debt overhang and capital structure," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
  19. Miao, Zixia & Huang, Yiping & Lv, Yingyi, 2025. "Corporate short-termism and the use of performance-sensitive debt," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
  20. Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Westerfield, Mark M., 2021. "Dynamic resource allocation with hidden volatility," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 560-581.
  21. Yaoyao Wu & Jinqiang Yang & Zhentao Zou, 2018. "Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 141-157, July.
  22. Huibing Cheng & Shanshui Zheng, 2022. "Incentive Compensation Mechanism for the Infrastructure Construction of Electric Vehicle Battery Swapping Station under Asymmetric Information," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(12), pages 1-18, June.
  23. Morellec, Erwan & Gryglewicz, Sebastian & Mayer, Simon, 2018. "Agency Conflicts over the Short and Long Run: Short-termism, Long-termism, and Pay-for-Luck," CEPR Discussion Papers 12720, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  24. Dirk Hackbarth & Alejandro Rivera & Tak-Yuen Wong, 2022. "Optimal Short-Termism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(9), pages 6477-6505, September.
  25. Gryglewicz, Sebastian & Mayer, Simon & Morellec, Erwan, 2020. "Agency conflicts and short- versus long-termism in corporate policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(3), pages 718-742.
  26. Taylor, Benjamin & Xiao, Ning & Sikorski, Janusz & Yong, Minloon & Harris, Tom & Helme, Tim & Smallbone, Andrew & Bhave, Amit & Kraft, Markus, 2013. "Techno-economic assessment of carbon-negative algal biodiesel for transport solutions," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 262-274.
  27. Shenzhe Jiang & Junjie Xia & Jiajun Xu & Jianye Yan, 2023. "A theory of National Development Bank: long-term investment and the agency problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(3), pages 995-1024, October.
  28. Hubert Bruslerie & Luminita Enache, 2023. "The dynamics of leverage of newly controlled target firms: evidence after an acquisition," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 411-445, August.
  29. Shan, Yaping, 2019. "Incentives for research agents and performance-vested equity-based compensation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 44-69.
  30. Yu Huang & Nengjiu Ju & Hao Xing, 2023. "Performance Evaluation, Managerial Hedging, and Contract Termination," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4953-4971, August.
  31. Jiajia Chang & Zhijun Hu & Hui Yang, 2020. "Venture Capital Contracting with Ambiguity Sharing and Effort Complementarity Effect," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(1), pages 1-16, January.
  32. Emma Hubert, 2023. "Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 605-661, July.
  33. Chong Lai & Rui Li & Yonghong Wu, 2020. "Optimal compensation and investment affected by firm size and time-varying external factors," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 407-422, September.
  34. Doruk Cetemen & Felix Zhiyu Feng & Can Urgun, 2019. "Contracting with Non-Exponential Discounting: Moral Hazard and Dynamic Inconsistency," Working Papers 2019-17, Princeton University. Economics Department..
  35. Ban, Mingyuan & Chen, Chang-Chih, 2019. "Ambiguity and capital structure adjustments," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 242-270.
  36. Sebastian Gryglewicz & Barney Hartman-Glaser & Geoffery Zheng, 2020. "Growth Options, Incentives, and Pay for Performance: Theory and Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(3), pages 1248-1277, March.
  37. Xiaolan Zhang, 2014. "Who Bears Firm-Level Risk? Implications for Cash Flow Volatility," 2014 Meeting Papers 184, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  38. Niu, Yingjie & Zou, Zhentao, 2024. "Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 196-217.
  39. Bensoussan, Alain & Chevalier-Roignant, Benoît & Rivera, Alejandro, 2021. "Does performance-sensitive debt mitigate debt overhang?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
  40. Wei Ye & Yong Zhang, 2019. "CEO traits, dynamic compensation and capital structure," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(2), pages 1-11, February.
  41. Anaya, Karim L. & Pollitt, Michael G., 2014. "Experience with smarter commercial arrangements for distributed wind generation," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 52-62.
  42. Alain Bensoussan & Benoit Chevalier-Roignant & Alejandro Rivera, 2021. "Does Performance-Sensitive Debt mitigate Debt Overhang?," Post-Print hal-03364891, HAL.
  43. Mu, Congming & Wang, Anxing & Yang, Jinqiang, 2017. "Optimal capital structure with moral hazard," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 326-338.
  44. li, Hong & Mu, Congming & Yang, Jinqiang, 2016. "Optimal contract theory with time-inconsistent preferences," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 52(PB), pages 519-530.
  45. Luo, Pengfei & Tan, Yingxian & Yang, Jinqiang & Yao, Yanming, 2023. "Underinvestment and optimal capital structure under environmental constraints," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
  46. Huang, Wenli & Liu, Wenqiong & Wang, Dongfang & Wang, Ying, 2023. "Agency and investment with triggered time-inconsistent preferences," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
  47. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2015. "A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement," KIER Working Papers 921, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  48. Chakraborti, Rajdeep & Dahiya, Sandeep & Ge, Lei & Gete, Pedro, 2024. "A model of managerial compensation, firm leverage and credit stimulus," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
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