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Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Dinev, Nikolay, 2017. "Voluntary Bankruptcy as Preemptive Persuasion," Economics Series 334, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  2. Perez-Richet, Eduardo & Vigier, Adrien & Bizzotto, Jacopo, 2019. "Information Design with Agency," CEPR Discussion Papers 13868, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Andrew Kosenko, 2020. "Mediated Persuasion," Papers 2012.00098, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
  4. Pavel Ilinov & Andrei Matveenko & Maxim Senkov & Egor Starkov, 2022. "Optimally Biased Expertise," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp736, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  5. Maxim Ivanov, 2021. "Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 955-1000, October.
  6. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Political disagreement and information in elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 390-412.
  7. Makoto Shimoji, 2016. "Rationalizable Persuasion," Discussion Papers 16/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
  8. Escudé, Matteo & Sinander, Ludvig, 2023. "Slow persuasion," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    • Matteo Escud'e & Ludvig Sinander, 2019. "Slow persuasion," Papers 1903.09055, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
  9. Smolin, Alex & Ichihashi, Shota, 2022. "Data Collection by an Informed Seller," TSE Working Papers 22-1330, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  10. Rosar, Frank, 2017. "Test design under voluntary participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 632-655.
  11. Navin Kartik & Frances Xu Lee & Wing Suen, 2021. "Information Validates the Prior: A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 165-182, June.
  12. Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021. "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 909-953, October.
  13. Matysková, Ludmila & Montes, Alfonso, 2023. "Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
  14. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2018. "On the value of persuasion by experts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 103-123.
  15. Shota Ichihashi & Alex Smolin, 2022. "Data Provision to an Informed Seller," Papers 2204.08723, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
  16. Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2021. "Persuasion and Welfare," Papers 2109.03061, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
  17. Ayça Özdoðan, 2016. "A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21.
  18. Makoto Shimoji, 2023. "Setting an exam as an information design problem," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(3), pages 559-579, September.
  19. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2020. "Confidence Management in Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 27186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Deepanshu Vasal, 2020. "Dynamic information design," Papers 2005.07267, arXiv.org.
  21. Anastasia Antsygina & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2023. "Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 743-780, April.
  22. Onuchic, Paula & Ray, Debraj, 2023. "Conveying value via categories," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
  23. Alexander M. Jakobsen, 2021. "An Axiomatic Model of Persuasion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(5), pages 2081-2116, September.
  24. Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Resisting persuasion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 723-742, October.
  25. Ludmila Matyskova, 2018. "Bayesian Persuasion with Costly Information Acquisition," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp614, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  26. Beauchêne, Dorian & Li, Jian & Li, Ming, 2019. "Ambiguous persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 312-365.
  27. Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
  28. J. Aislinn Bohren & Daniel N. Hauser, 2023. "Behavioral Foundations of Model Misspecification," PIER Working Paper Archive 23-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  29. Shaofei Jiang, 2024. "Costly Persuasion by a Partially Informed Sender," Papers 2401.14087, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
  30. Saltuk Ozerturk, 2018. "Choosing a media outlet when seeking public approval," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 3-21, January.
  31. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2021. "Organizing Data Analytics," CEPR Discussion Papers 16768, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  32. Meng, Delong, 2021. "Learning from like-minded people," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 231-250.
  33. Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Anton Kolotilin, 2018. "When to Drop a Bombshell," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(4), pages 2139-2172.
  34. Zerbini, Antoine, 2023. "The Case for Lobbying Transparency," SocArXiv w6vam, Center for Open Science.
  35. Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas, 2021. "Noisy persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 44-61.
  36. Negrelli, Sara, 2020. "Bubbles and persuasion with uncertainty over market sentiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 67-85.
  37. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Karos, Dominik & Kerman, Toygar, 2020. "Belief Inducibility and Informativeness," Research Memorandum 027, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
  38. Chan, Jimmy & Gupta, Seher & Li, Fei & Wang, Yun, 2019. "Pivotal persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 178-202.
    • Jimmy Chan & Seher Gupta & Fei Li & Yun Wang, 2018. "Pivotal Persuasion," Working Papers 2018-11-03, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
  39. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," TSE Working Papers 21-1247, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  40. Axel Anderson & Nikoloz Pkhakadze, 2023. "Polarizing Persuasion," Working Papers gueconwpa~23-23-04, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  41. Maxim Senkov & Toygar T. Kerman, 2024. "Changing Simplistic Worldviews," Papers 2401.02867, arXiv.org.
  42. Rastislav Rehak & Maxim Senkov, 2021. "Form of Preference Misalignment Linked to State-Pooling Structure in Bayesian Persuasion," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp708, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  43. Simon Board & Jay Lu, 2018. "Competitive Information Disclosure in Search Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(5), pages 1965-2010.
  44. Farzaneh Farhadi & Demosthenis Teneketzis, 2022. "Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 443-484, June.
  45. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R., 2016. "Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 110-134.
  46. Aristidou, Andreas & Coricelli, Giorgio & Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2019. "Incentives or Persuasion? An Experimental Investigation," Research Memorandum 012, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
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