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Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Hamid Nazerzadeh & Amin Saberi & Rakesh Vohra, 2013. "Dynamic Pay-Per-Action Mechanisms and Applications to Online Advertising," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 61(1), pages 98-111, February.
  2. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso V‰lim‰ki, 2010. "The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 771-789, March.
  4. Salant, David J. & Cabral, Luís, 2019. "Sequential auctions and auction revenue," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 1-4.
  5. Sano, Ryuji, 2021. "Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 465-473.
  6. Yiwei Chen & Vivek F. Farias & Nikolaos Trichakis, 2019. "On the Efficacy of Static Prices for Revenue Management in the Face of Strategic Customers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(12), pages 5535-5555, December.
  7. Hummel, Patrick, 2015. "Simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 269-284.
  8. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
  9. Tao Zhang & Quanyan Zhu, 2019. "On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design With Exit Option in a Markovian Environment," Papers 1909.13720, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
  10. Yiwei Chen & Nikolaos Trichakis, 2021. "Technical Note—On Revenue Management with Strategic Customers Choosing When and What to Buy," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 175-187, January.
  11. Joosung Lee & Daniel Z. Li, 2018. "Sequential Search Auctions with a Deadline," Working Papers 2018_03, Durham University Business School.
  12. Ryuji Sano, 2015. "A Dynamic Mechanism Design for Scheduling with Different Use Lengths," KIER Working Papers 924, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  13. Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000035, David K. Levine.
  14. Sham M. Kakade & Ilan Lobel & Hamid Nazerzadeh, 2013. "Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 61(4), pages 837-854, August.
  15. Daniel F. Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2012. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 879-925.
  16. Yiwei Chen & Vivek F. Farias, 2018. "Robust Dynamic Pricing with Strategic Customers," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 43(4), pages 1119-1142, November.
  17. Thomas D. Jeitschko & Pallavi Pal, 2021. "Curbing Price Fluctuations in Cap-and-Trade Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 9266, CESifo.
  18. Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2017. "Calendar mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 252-270.
  19. Ryuji Sano, 2017. "A Dynamic Mechanism Design with Overbooking, Different Deadlines, and Multi-unit Demands," KIER Working Papers 963, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  20. Hanzhe Zhang, 2021. "Prices versus auctions in large markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(4), pages 1297-1337, November.
  21. Vahab Mirrokni & Renato Paes Leme & Pingzhong Tang & Song Zuo, 2020. "Non‐Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 1939-1963, September.
  22. Roman Zakharenko, 2020. "Traffic Priority Mechanisms," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(5), pages 1211-1224, September.
  23. Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019. "Monotone contracts," Economics Working Papers 1647, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  24. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
  25. Tao Zhang & Quanyan Zhu, 2022. "On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design With Exit Option in a Markovian Environment," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 701-745, June.
  26. Jeffrey C. Ely & Daniel F. Garrett & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2017. "Overbooking," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(6), pages 1258-1301.
  27. Simon Board & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2016. "Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1046-1087.
  28. Deb, Rahul & Said, Maher, 2015. "Dynamic screening with limited commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 891-928.
  29. Liu, Heng, 2018. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
  30. Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2015. "Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 45-76.
  31. Ron Lavi & Ella Segev, 2014. "Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 791-819, November.
  32. Hanzhe Zhang, 2013. "The Optimal Sequence of Costly Mechanisms," Working Papers 2014-005, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
  33. Emil Temnyalov, 2019. "Points mechanisms and rewards programs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 436-457, June.
  34. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack, 2018. "Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(5), pages 2031-2046, May.
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