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Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Liu, Bo & Niu, Yingjie & Zhang, Yuhua, 2019. "Corporate liquidity and risk management with time-inconsistent preferences," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 295-307.
  2. Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019. "Monotone contracts," Economics Working Papers 1647, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  3. Rui Li & Dana Kiku & Hengjie Ai, 2014. "A Mechanism Design Model of Firm Dynamics: The Case of Limited Commitment," 2014 Meeting Papers 855, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Jianfeng Zhang & Zimu Zhu, 2025. "A Dynamic Principal-Agent Problem with One-Sided Commitment," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 50(4), pages 2600-2632, November.
  5. Zhang, Yuzhe, 2013. "Characterization of a risk sharing contract with one-sided commitment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 794-809.
  6. Hengjie Ai & Dana Kiku & Rui Li & Jincheng Tong, 2021. "A Unified Model of Firm Dynamics with Limited Commitment and Assortative Matching," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(1), pages 317-356, February.
  7. Miao, Jianjun & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2015. "A duality approach to continuous-time contracting problems with limited commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 929-988.
  8. Yaping Shan, 2013. "Incentives for Research Agents: Optimal Contracts and Implementation," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2013-20, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  9. Patrick Bolton & Neng Wang & Jinqiang Yang, 2019. "Optimal Contracting, Corporate Finance, and Valuation with Inalienable Human Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 74(3), pages 1363-1429, June.
  10. Th'eo Durandard, 2023. "Dynamic delegation in promotion contests," Papers 2308.05668, arXiv.org.
  11. An, Jongbong & Jeon, Junkee & Kim, Takwon, 2026. "Optimal contract design with labor–leisure choice under limited commitment: A free boundary approach," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 239(C), pages 967-985.
  12. Niu, Yingjie & Yang, Jinqiang & Zou, Zhentao, 2020. "Robust contracts with one-sided commitment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
  13. Borys Grochulski & Yuzhe Zhang, 2017. "Market‐Based Incentives," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 331-382, May.
  14. Felix Feng, 2018. "Dynamic Compensation under Uncertainty Shocks and Limited Commitment," 2018 Meeting Papers 159, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  15. Dirk Krueger & Fulin Li & Harald Uhlig, 2024. "Neoclassical Growth Transition Dynamics with One-Sided Commitment," NBER Working Papers 32880, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Kyoung Jin Choi & Hyeng Keun Koo & Byung Hwa Lim & Jane Yoo, 2024. "Endogenous Credit, Business Cycle, and Portfolio Selection," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 72(3), pages 871-884, May.
  17. Wang, Cheng & Yang, Youzhi, 2019. "Optimal self-enforcement and termination," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 161-186.
  18. Krueger, Dirk & Uhlig, Harald, 2023. "Neoclassical growth with long-term one-sided commitment contracts," CFS Working Paper Series 698, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  19. Jeon, Junkee & Koo, Hyeng Keun & Shin, Yong Hyun, 2018. "Portfolio selection with consumption ratcheting," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 153-182.
  20. Dirk Krueger & Harald Uhlig, 2022. "Neoclassical Growth with Limited Commitment," NBER Working Papers 30518, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Niu, Yingjie & Zou, Zhentao, 2024. "Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 196-217.
  22. Ma, Jinrun & Wu, Yaoyao & Liang, Yongtang, 2023. "Robust investment and hedging policy with limited commitment," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
  23. Wu, Wei & Niu, Yingjie & Wu, Yaoyao & Xu, Hongru, 2022. "Ambiguity, limited commitment, and the q theory of investment," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
  24. Shan, Yaping, 2019. "Incentives for research agents and performance-vested equity-based compensation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 44-69.
  25. Yaping Shan, 2017. "Optimal contracts for research agents," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(1), pages 94-124, March.
  26. Bensoussan, Alain & Chevalier-Roignant, Benoit & Nguyen, Nam & Rivera, Alejandro, 2024. "Financing green entrepreneurs under limited commitment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
  27. Junkee Jeon & Hyeng Keun Koo & Kyunghyun Park, 2018. "Optimal Insurance with Limited Commitment in a Finite Horizon," Papers 1812.11669, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2019.
  28. Ai, Hengjie & Li, Rui, 2015. "Investment and CEO compensation under limited commitment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 452-472.
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