Informal communication

Citations

Cited by:

1. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
2. Alistair Wilson, 2011. "Costly Communication in Groups: Theory and an Experiment," Working Paper 488, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jul 2012.
3. Li, Ming & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2009. "Credibility for Sale: the Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission," Working Papers 09008, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2009.
   • LI, Ming & MYLOVANOV, Tymofiy, 2010. "Credibility for Sale - The Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission," Cahiers de recherche 08-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
4. Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2015. "Information transmission in nested sender–receiver games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 543-569, April.
   • Sidartha Gordon & Ying Chen, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers 2014-04, Sciences Po Departement of Economics.
   • Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," Working Papers hal-00973071, HAL.
   • Sidartha Gordon & Ying Chen, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," Sciences Po publications 2014-04, Sciences Po.
5. Bijkerk, Suzanne H. & Karamychev, Vladimir & Swank, Otto H., 2018. "When words are not enough," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 294-314.
6. Ivan Balbuzanov, 2019. "Lies and consequences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1203-1240, December.
7. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2006. "Media Bias and Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 280-316, April.
   • Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse Shapiro, 2005. "Media Bias and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 11664, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
8. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter Norman, 2006. "Professional advice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 120-142, January.
   • Marco Ottaviani & Peter Sorensen, 1999. "Professional Advice," Game Theory and Information 9906003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
9. Lai, Ernest K., 2014. "Expert advice for amateurs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-16.
10. Kim, Kyungmin & Pogach, Jonathan, 2014. "Honesty vs. advocacy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 51-74.
11. Ascensión Andina-Díaz, 2015. "Competition and uncertainty in a paper’s news desk," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 116(1), pages 77-93, September.
    • Ascensión Andina Díaz, 2013. "Competition and uncertainty in a paper's news desk," Working Papers 2013-02, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
12. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/5adcidkke9omt0s9p6m01j1rh is not listed on IDEAS
13. Valsecchi, Irene, 2008. "Learning from Experts," International Energy Markets Working Papers 36756, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
14. Alistair Wilson, 2012. "Costly Communication in Groups: Theory and an Experiment," Working Paper 499, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Feb 2014.
15. Chen, Ying & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Effective persuasion," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1310, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
16. Fudenberg, Drew & Gao, Ying & Pei, Harry, 2022. "A reputation for honesty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
17. Chen, Ying, 2012. "Value of public information in sender–receiver games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 343-345.
18. Oded Berman & Mohammad M. Fazel-Zarandi & Dmitry Krass, 2019. "Truthful Cheap Talk: Why Operational Flexibility May Lead to Truthful Communication," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1624-1641, April.
19. Di Maggio, Marco, 2009. "Accountability and Cheap Talk," MPRA Paper 18652, University Library of Munich, Germany.
20. Yasuyuki Miyahara & Hitoshi Sadakane, 2020. "Communication Enhancement through Information Acquisition by Uninformed Player," KIER Working Papers 1050, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
21. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2019. "Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(2), pages 303-334, September.
22. Gneezy, Uri & Gravert, Christina & Saccardo, Silvia & Tausch, Franziska, 2017. "A must lie situation – avoiding giving negative feedback," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 445-454.
23. Kartik, Navin & Ottaviani, Marco & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Credulity, lies, and costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 93-116, May.
24. Irene Valsecchi, 2008. "Learning from Experts," Working Papers 2008.35, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
25. , & , J. & ,, 2007. "Noisy talk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(4), December.
    • Andreas Blume & Oliver Board & Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Noisy Talk," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 167, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
26. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5adcidkke9omt0s9p6m01j1rh is not listed on IDEAS
27. Junghun Cho, 2006. "Multiple Advisors with Reputation," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp314, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.