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On the role of verifiability and commitment in credence goods markets

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Balafoutas, Loukas & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2020. "Credence goods in the literature: What the past fifteen years have taught us about fraud, incentives, and the role of institutions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C).
  2. Katharina Momsen & Markus Ohndorf, 2022. "Seller Opportunism in Credence Good Markets – The Role of Market Conditions," Working Papers 2022-10, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
  3. Liu, Fang & Rasch, Alexander & Schwarz, Marco A. & Waibel, Christian, 2025. "The role of diagnostic ability in markets for expert services," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
  4. Balafoutas, Loukas & Fornwagner, Helena & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Sutter, Matthias & Tverdostup, Maryna, 2020. "Diagnostic Uncertainty and Insurance Coverage in Credence Goods Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 13848, IZA Network @ LISER.
  5. Sumana Kundu, "undated". "Undertreatment in credence goods markets: When does a no liability rule outperform?," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2025-015, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  6. Ogawa, Hiromasa, 2024. "Expert’s reputation concern and consumer information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 80-92.
  7. Yongmin Chen & Jianpei Li & Jin Zhang, 2022. "Efficient Liability In Expert Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1717-1744, November.
  8. Helmut Bester & Matthias Dahm, 2018. "Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis and Subjective Evaluation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(611), pages 1367-1394, June.
  9. Zhao, Lin, 2026. "Information disclosure in expert's market with diagnostic uncertainty," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
  10. Ouyang, Yaofu, 2016. "Credence Goods, Risk Averse, and Optimal Insurance," MPRA Paper 70392, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Colombo, Ferdinando & Ursino, Giovanni, 2025. "Beliefs, credence goods and information campaigns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).
  12. Ben Greiner & Le Zhang & Chengxiang Tang, 2017. "Separation of prescription and treatment in health care markets: A laboratory experiment," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(S3), pages 21-35, December.
  13. Ahlin, Christian & Kim, In Kyung & Kim, Kyoo il, 2021. "Who commits fraud? evidence from korean gas stations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
  14. Loukas Balafoutas & Helena Fornwagner & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter & Maryna Tverdostup, 2023. "Serving Consumers in an Uncertain World: A Credence Goods Experiment," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 258, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  15. Chen, Yongmin & Li, Jianpei & Zhang, Jin, 2017. "Liability in Markets for Credence Goods," MPRA Paper 80206, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Karine Lamiraud & Radu Vranceanu, 2025. "A two-sector model of healthcare provision with directed search," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 99(4), pages 877-907, December.
  17. Bester, Helmut & Ouyang, Yaofu, 2018. "Optimal procurement of a credence good under limited liability," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 96-129.
  18. Yuk‐Fai Fong & Xiaoxiao Hu & Ting Liu & Xiaoxuan Meng, 2020. "Using Customer Service to Build Clients’ Trust," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 136-155, March.
  19. Xiaoyan Xu & Weishi Lim & Xing Zhang & Jeff Cai, 2025. "Doing Less for More: Consumer Search and Undertreatment in Credence Service Markets," Papers 2503.21175, arXiv.org.
  20. Li, Jianpei & Ouyang, Yaofu, 2016. "Expert Costs and the Role of Verifiability," MPRA Paper 74390, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Ferdinando Colombo & Giovanni Ursino, 2026. "Second opinions in high-stakes credence goods markets: transparency as a discipline mechanism," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 147(4), pages 1-30, December.
  22. Winand Emons & Severin Lenhard, 2025. "The Economics of Advice," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 67(2), pages 111-131, August.
  23. Bertrand Crettez & Régis Deloche & Marie‐Hélène Jeanneret‐Crettez, 2020. "A demand‐induced overtreatment model with heterogeneous experts," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1713-1733, September.
  24. Fong, Yuk-fai & Liu, Ting, 2018. "Liability and reputation in credence goods markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 35-39.
  25. Liu, Ting & Ma, Ching-to Albert, 2024. "Equilibrium information in credence goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 84-101.
  26. Xiaoxiao Hu & Haoran Lei, 2023. "Irrelevance of personalized pricing under strategic market segmentation," Papers 2303.13295, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2025.
  27. Jelnov Artyom, 2025. "Addictive Treatment," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 25(4), pages 1023-1031.
  28. Momsen, Katharina & Ohndorf, Markus, 2026. "Credence goods: Moral wiggle room and contractual opportunism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 246(C).
  29. Martin Obradovits & Philipp Plaickner, 2024. "Searching for Treatment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 180(1), pages 144-186.
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