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Citations for "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring"

by Cole, Harold L. & Kocherlakota, Narayana R.

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  1. Stephen Morris & George J Mailath, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," 2005 Meeting Papers 25, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  2. Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2007. "A minority game with bounded recall," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6381, Paris Dauphine University.
  3. Aperjis, Christina & Zeckhauser, Richard J. & Miao, Yali, 2014. "Variable temptations and black mark reputations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 70-90.
  4. Aperjis, Christina & Miao, Yali & Zeckhauser, Richard Jay, 2011. "Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations," Scholarly Articles 5027138, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
  5. Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme, 2004. "Time Dependent Bounded Recall Strategies Are Enough to Play the Discounted Repeated Prisoners Dilemma," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp449, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
  6. Łukasz Balbus & Kevin Reffett & Łukasz Woźny, 2013. "Markov Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Supermodular Games with Imperfect Private and Public Information," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 187-206, June.
  7. Ted Temzelides & Jialin Yu, 2001. "On Money as a Substitute for Perfect Recall," Macroeconomics 0012020, EconWPA.
  8. George J. Mailath & : Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Jul 2008.
  9. George Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Francesco Lancia & Alessia Russo, 2011. "Self-Commitment-Institutions and Cooperation in Overlapping Generations Games," Department of Economics 0668, University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi".
  11. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2006. "Private monitoring with infinite histories," Staff Report 383, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  12. Daniel Monte & Maher Said, 2014. "The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 59-82, May.
  13. Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2008. "Playing off-line games with bounded rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 207-223, September.
  14. Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme & Sabourian, Hamid, 2009. "Repeated games with one-memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 312-336, January.
  15. Alistair Wilson & Hong Wu, 2014. "Dissolution of Partnerships in Infinitely Repeated Games," Working Papers 532, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2014.
  16. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2012. "Restricted feedback in long term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 142-161.
  17. Qingmin Liu, 2006. "Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics," Discussion Papers 06-030, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  18. Wojciech Olszewski & Johannes Horner, 2008. "How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect," 2008 Meeting Papers 895, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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