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Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian, 2022. "Order of Commitments in Bayesian Persuasion with Partial-informed Senders," Papers 2202.06479, arXiv.org.
  2. Ozan Candogan & Kimon Drakopoulos, 2020. "Optimal Signaling of Content Accuracy: Engagement vs. Misinformation," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 497-515, March.
  3. Quan Li & Kang Rong, 2024. "Full disclosure in competitive Bayesian persuasion," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(2), pages 525-545, June.
  4. Wen, Hui & Ho, Ken C. & Gao, Jijun & Yu, Li, 2022. "The fundamental effects of ESG disclosure quality in boosting the growth of ESG investing," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
  5. Kemal Kivanc Akoz & Arseniy Samsonov, 2023. "Bargaining over information structures," Discussion Papers 2301, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Quantitative Social and Management Sciences.
  6. Dirk Bergemann & Marek Bojko & Paul DŸtting & Renato Paes Leme & Haifeng Xu & Song Zuo, 2024. "Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2418, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Benjamin Brooks & Alexander Frankel & Emir Kamenica, 2025. "Representing type spaces as signal allocations," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(1), pages 37-43, April.
  8. Atakan, Alp & Ekmekci, Mehmet & Renou, Ludovic, 2024. "Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
  9. Wu, Jiemai, 2020. "Non-competing persuaders," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
  10. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2019. "Private communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 258-283.
  11. Pak Hung Au & Mark Whitmeyer, 2018. "Attraction versus Persuasion: Information Provision in Search Markets," Papers 1802.09396, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
  12. Jonas Hedlund & T. Florian Kauffeldt & Malte Lammert, 2021. "Correction to: Persuasion under ambiguity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 483-483, May.
  13. Aköz, Kemal Kıvanç & Samsonov, Arseniy, 2025. "Information agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
  14. Zeng, Yishu, 2023. "Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  15. Claude Fluet & Thomas Lanzi, 2021. "Cross-Examination," Cahiers de recherche 2108, Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques.
  16. Dilip Ravindran & Zhihan Cui, 2020. "Competing Persuaders in Zero-Sum Games," Papers 2008.08517, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
  17. Kitano, Wataru, 2025. "Information quality in sequential persuasion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 254(C).
  18. Matysková, Ludmila & Montes, Alfonso, 2023. "Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
  19. Ronen Gradwohl & Niklas Hahn & Martin Hoefer & Rann Smorodinsky, 2020. "Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2006.02048, arXiv.org.
  20. Yotam Gafni & Ronen Gradwohl & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2024. "Prediction-sharing During Training and Inference," Papers 2403.17515, arXiv.org.
  21. Teddy Mekonnen & Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2024. "Competition, Persuasion, and Search," Papers 2411.11183, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2025.
  22. Mark Whitmeyer & Cole Williams, 2024. "Dynamic Signals," Papers 2407.16648, arXiv.org.
  23. Daniil Larionov & Hien Pham & Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2025. "First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(4), pages 889-898, November.
  24. Áron Tóbiás, 2023. "Cognitive limits and preferences for information," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 46(1), pages 221-253, June.
  25. Daehong Min, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 743-764, October.
  26. Jiwoong Shin & Chi-Ying Wang, 2024. "The Role of Messenger in Advertising Content: Bayesian Persuasion Perspective," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(4), pages 840-862, July.
  27. Parakhonyak, Alexei & Vikander, Nick, 2023. "Information design through scarcity and social learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
  28. Jacqueline Sanchez-Rabaza & Jose Maria Rocha-Martinez & Julio B. Clempner, 2023. "Characterizing Manipulation via Machiavellianism," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(19), pages 1-19, September.
  29. Roy, Jaideep & Silvers, Randy & Sun, Ching-Jen, 2019. "Majoritarian preference, utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 269-288.
  30. Doron Klunover & John Morgan, 2019. "A Model of Presidential Debates," Papers 1907.01362, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2020.
  31. Arjada Bardhi & Nina Bobkova, 2023. "Local Evidence and Diversity in Minipublics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(9), pages 2451-2508.
  32. Raphael Boleslavsky & Silvana Krasteva, 2025. "Limits of Disclosure in Search Markets," Papers 2506.06319, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2025.
  33. Deepanshu Vasal, 2020. "Dynamic information design," Papers 2005.07267, arXiv.org.
  34. Arlindo Skenderaj, 2025. "Selling supplemental information," Papers 2511.14103, arXiv.org.
  35. Julio B. Clempner, 2025. "Manipulation Game Considering No-Regret Strategies," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-18, January.
  36. Au, Pak Hung & Kawai, Keiichi, 2020. "Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 56-78.
  37. Kerman, Toygar & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Karos, Dominik, 2020. "Persuading Strategic Voters," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
  38. Junze Sun & Arthur Schram & Randolph Sloof, 2019. "A Theory on Media Bias and Elections," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-048/I, Tinbergen Institute.
  39. Li, Fei & Norman, Peter, 2018. "On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 66-70.
  40. Wu, Wenhao, 2023. "Sequential Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
  41. Simon Board & Jay Lu, 2018. "Competitive Information Disclosure in Search Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(5), pages 1965-2010.
  42. Shota Ichihashi, 2020. "Non-competing Data Intermediaries," Staff Working Papers 20-28, Bank of Canada.
  43. Farzaneh Farhadi & Demosthenis Teneketzis, 2022. "Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 443-484, June.
  44. Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias, 2022. "Information manipulation and competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 245-263.
  45. Wu, Wenhao & Ye, Bohan, 2023. "Competition in persuasion: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 72-89.
  46. Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Resisting persuasion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 723-742, October.
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