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Representing type spaces as signal allocations

Author

Listed:
  • Benjamin Brooks

    (University of Chicago)

  • Alexander Frankel

    (University of Chicago)

  • Emir Kamenica

    (University of Chicago)

Abstract

Consider a set of agents uncertain about the state in some finite state space $$\Omega $$ Ω . A type space $$\left( \varvec{T},Q\right) $$ T , Q that describes the agents’ information consists of a finite product set $$\varvec{T}=T_{1}\times \cdots \times T_{n}$$ T = T 1 × ⋯ × T n , and a probability distribution $$Q\in \Delta \left( \Omega \times \varvec{T}\right) $$ Q ∈ Δ Ω × T . Alternatively, a signal allocation assigns to each agent i a signal $$\pi _{i}$$ π i , a finite partition of $$\Omega \times X$$ Ω × X where X is a measurable space endowed with a non-atomic probability measure. Every signal allocation induces a type space in which the types in $$T_{i}$$ T i are the elements of $$\pi _{i}$$ π i . We establish two results. First, every type space is equivalent to one that is induced by a signal allocation. Second, encoding of type spaces into signal allocations can be done myopically, one agent at a time.

Suggested Citation

  • Benjamin Brooks & Alexander Frankel & Emir Kamenica, 2025. "Representing type spaces as signal allocations," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(1), pages 37-43, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:13:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-024-00278-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s40505-024-00278-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. MERTENS, Jean-François & ZAMIR, Shmuel, 1985. "Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information," LIDAM Reprints CORE 608, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Benjamin Brooks & Alexander Frankel & Emir Kamenica, 2024. "Comparisons of Signals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(9), pages 2981-3006, September.
    3. Alexander Frankel & Emir Kamenica, 2019. "Quantifying Information and Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(10), pages 3650-3680, October.
    4. Gentzkow, Matthew & Kamenica, Emir, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 411-429.
    5. John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
    6. Benjamin Brooks & Alexander Frankel & Emir Kamenica, 2022. "Information Hierarchies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2187-2214, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Type spaces; Signals;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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