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Economic implications of imperfect quality certification

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Bottega, Lucie & De Freitas, Jenny, 2019. "Imperfect certification in a Bertrand duopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 33-36.
  2. Chalfant, James A. & James, Jennifer S. & Lavoie, Nathalie & Sexton, Richard J., 1999. "Asymmetric Grading Error And Adverse Selection: Lemons In The California Prune Industry," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 24(01), pages 1-23, July.
  3. Miguel Carriquiry & Bruce A. Babcock, 2007. "Reputations, Market Structure, and the Choice of Quality Assurance Systems in the Food Industry," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 89(1), pages 12-23.
  4. Stéphan Marette & John Crespi, 2003. "Can Quality Certification Lead to Stable Cartels?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 23(1), pages 43-64, August.
  5. Kuhn, Michael, 1999. "Green Lemons - Environmental Labels and Entry into an Environmentally Differentiated Market under Asymmetric Information," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 20, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
  6. Rosamartina Schena & Domenico Morrone & Angeloantonio Russo, 2023. "The competition between private label and national brand through the signal of Euro‐leaf," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(8), pages 6169-6181, December.
  7. Na-Youn Kim, 2019. "Do Reputable Underwriters Affect the Sustainability of Newly Listed Firms? Evidence from South Korea," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(9), pages 1-19, May.
  8. Dimitri, Carolyn & Lichtenberg, Erik, 2000. "Verification In Contracts With Random Changes In Quality," Working Papers 28565, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
  9. Gu, Yiquan, 2008. "Imperfect Certification," Ruhr Economic Papers 78, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
  10. Liu, Ye & Fang, Libing & Yu, Honghai, 2018. "Do reputable certifiers of quality exploit their reputations? Evidence from China’s IPO market," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 72-74.
  11. Creane, Anthony & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Sim, Kyoungbo, 2022. "Welfare effects of product certification under latent adverse selection," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
  12. Gomez, Emilio Galdeano & Lorente, Jose Cespedes & Rodriguez, Manuel Rodriguez, 2002. "Environmental and Quality Improvement Practices: Their Analysis as Components of the Value Added in Horticultural Firms," 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain 24870, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  13. Dimitri, Carolyn & Lichtenberg, Erik, 2002. "Quality Inspection, Adverse Selection And Trade In Perishable Commodities," Working Papers 28579, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
  14. repec:osf:socarx:ay8rq_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Miguel Carriquiry & Bruce A. Babcock & Roxana Carbone, 2003. "Optimal Quality Assurance Systems for Agricultural Outputs," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 03-wp328, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
  16. Laboratoire d’Economie Forestière, 2006. "Perspectives de Recherche en Economie Forestière en France : Programmes Prioritaires pour la Période 2005-2008," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF 2006-01, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA.
  17. Giovanni Anania & Rosanna Nisticò, 2004. "Public Regulation as a Substitute for Trust in Quality Food Markets: What if the Trust Substitute cannot be Fully Trusted?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(4), pages 681-701, December.
  18. Rosar, Frank, 2017. "Test design under voluntary participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 632-655.
  19. M. K. Haener & Martin K. Luckert, 1998. "Forest Certification: Economic Issues and Welfare Implications," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 24(s2), pages 83-94, May.
  20. Lisette Ibanez & Gilles Grolleau, 2008. "Can Ecolabeling Schemes Preserve the Environment?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(2), pages 233-249, June.
  21. Dimitri Carolyn, 2003. "Agricultural Marketing Institutions: A Response to Quality Disputes," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-25, September.
  22. Sungho Yun, 2021. "Regulating corruptible certifier behavior," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 109-135, April.
  23. Crespi, John M. & Marette, Stephan, 2003. "Some Economic Implications Of Public Labeling," Journal of Food Distribution Research, Food Distribution Research Society, vol. 34(3), pages 1-12, November.
  24. Schumacher, Ingmar, 2010. "Ecolabeling, consumers' preferences and taxation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(11), pages 2202-2212, September.
  25. Erik Durbin, 2000. "McDonald's or the Michelin Guide? Revealing Quality Through Private-Sector Certification," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1097, Econometric Society.
  26. Yiquan Gu, 2008. "Imperfect Certification," Ruhr Economic Papers 0078, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  27. Charu Grover & Sangeeta Bansal, "undated". "Imperfect Certification under Cournot Duopoly," Centre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi Discussion Papers 15-03, Centre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.
  28. Fritz, Qi Gao, 2023. "Label to match - Firms’ signaling decisions when not everyone cares," SocArXiv ay8rq, Center for Open Science.
  29. Coestier, Bénédicte, 1995. "Asymétrie d'information, réputation et signes de qualités," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9505, CEPREMAP.
  30. Liang, Jing & Jensen, Helen H., 2008. "Marketing Agreement, Food Safety and Contract Design," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6434, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  31. Miguel Carriquiry & Bruce A. Babcock, 2004. "Reputation, Quality Observability, and the Choice of Quality Assurance Systems," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 04-wp373, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
  32. Dorothée Brécard, 2017. "Consumer misperception of eco-labels, green market structure and welfare," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 340-364, June.
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