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Fully aggregative games

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Takeshi Fukasawa, 2023. "The Use of Symmetry for Models with Variable-size Variables," Papers 2311.08650, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
  2. Motta, Massimo & Tarantino, Emanuele, 2021. "The effect of horizontal mergers, when firms compete in prices and investments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
  3. Itaya, Jun-ichi & Cornes, Richard, 2016. "Alternative Objectives in an Oligopoly Model : An Aggregative Game Approach," Discussion paper series. A 307, Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University.
  4. Rötzer, Sebastian, 2022. "Common Owners as Active Monitors: A Theory of Rational Neglect," MPRA Paper 114560, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Parenti, Mathieu, 2018. "Large and small firms in a global market: David vs. Goliath," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 103-118.
  6. Nava Kahana & Doron Klunover, 2017. "Sequential Lottery Contests with Multiple Participants," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2017-02, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  7. Koriyama, Yukio & Ozkes, Ali I., 2021. "Inclusive cognitive hierarchy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 458-480.
  8. Braouezec, Yann & Kiani, Keyvan, 2023. "Economic foundations of generalized games with shared constraint: Do binding agreements lead to less Nash equilibria?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 308(1), pages 467-479.
  9. Yann BRAOUEZEC & Keyvan KIANI, 2021. "Economic foundations of generalized games with shared constraint: Do binding agreements lead to less Nash equilibria?," Working Papers 2021-ACF-06, IESEG School of Management.
  10. Acemoglu, Daron & Jensen, Martin Kaae, 2013. "Aggregate comparative statics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 27-49.
  11. Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2018. "Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 126-129.
  12. Ken-ichi Suzuki & Jun-ichi Itaya & Akitomo Yamanashi & Tatsuyoshi Miyakoshi, 2018. "Existence, Uniqueness, and Algorithm for Identifying Free Riders in Multiple Public Good Games: Replacement Function Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series 7062, CESifo.
  13. Mauersberger, Felix & Nagel, Rosemarie & Bühren, Christoph, 2020. "Bounded rationality in Keynesian beauty contests: A lesson for central bankers?," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 14, pages 1-38.
  14. Simon P. Anderson, Nisvan Erkal and, 2009. "Aggregative Oligopoly Games with Entry," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1175, The University of Melbourne, revised 2013.
  15. Parise, Francesca & Ozdaglar, Asuman, 2019. "A variational inequality framework for network games: Existence, uniqueness, convergence and sensitivity analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 47-82.
  16. Ruda Zhang & Roger Ghanem, 2020. "Multi-market Oligopoly of Equal Capacity," Papers 2012.06742, arXiv.org.
  17. Yukio Koriyama & Ali Ihsan Ozkes, 2017. "Condorcet Jury Theorem and Cognitive Hierarchies: Theory and Experiments," Working Papers halshs-01485748, HAL.
  18. Nocetti, Diego & Smith, William T., 2015. "Changes in risk and strategic interaction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 37-46.
  19. Simone Balmelli & Francesco Moresino, 2023. "Coordination of Plug-In Electric Vehicle Charging in a Stochastic Framework: A Decentralized Tax/Incentive-Based Mechanism to Reach Global Optimality," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-24, February.
  20. Anja Brumme & Wolfgang Buchholz & Dirk Rübbelke, 2023. "The purity of impure public goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(3), pages 493-514, June.
  21. Alex Dickson, 2017. "Multiple-aggregate games," Working Papers 1701, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
  22. Richard Cornes, 2016. "Aggregative Environmental Games," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(2), pages 339-365, February.
  23. Possajennikov, Alex, 2015. "Conjectural variations in aggregative games: An evolutionary perspective," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 55-61.
  24. Finn Christensen, 2019. "Comparative statics and heterogeneity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(3), pages 665-702, April.
  25. Volker Nocke & Nicolas Schutz, 2018. "Multiproduct‐Firm Oligopoly: An Aggregative Games Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(2), pages 523-557, March.
  26. Martin Alfaro, 2020. "On Strategic Investments by Leader Firms under Endogenous Entry and Quantity Competition," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(4), pages 3231-3240.
  27. Andreas Hefti & Julian Teichgräber, 2021. "Inequality in models with a competition for market shares," ECON - Working Papers 375, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  28. Alfaro, Martin & Lander, David, 2021. "Restricting entry without aggressive pricing," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(4), pages 305-319.
  29. Luis C. Corchón, 2021. "Aggregative games," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 49-71, March.
  30. Jin Yeub Kim & Yongjun Kim & Myungkyu Shim, 2019. "Do Financial Analysts Herd?," Working papers 2019rwp-161, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
  31. Okumura, Yasunori, 2015. "Existence of free entry equilibrium in aggregative games with asymmetric agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 14-16.
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