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Citations for "Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games"

by Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay

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  1. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-720, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  2. Heski Bar-Isaac, 2001. "Self-Confidence and Survival," FMG Discussion Papers dp395, Financial Markets Group.
  3. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1999. "Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation," CESifo Working Paper Series 213, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Cheng Wang, 2000. "Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(3), pages 396-422, July.
  5. Bård Harstad, 2013. "The Market for Conservation and Other Hostages," CESifo Working Paper Series 4296, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Matthew O. Jackson & Alison Watts, 2005. "Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0503003, EconWPA.
  7. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2003. "Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-27, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  8. Sergei Guriev & Dmitriy Kvasov, 2005. "Contracting on Time," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/4et5cqo2b89, Sciences Po.
  9. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2008. "Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations," MPRA Paper 37527, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Jan 2009.
  10. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998. "Costly coasian contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3583, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  11. Sergei Guriev & Dmitriy Kvasov, 2005. "Contracting on Time," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1369-1385, December.
  12. Ambrus, Attila, 2009. "Theories of Coalitional Rationality," Scholarly Articles 3204917, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  13. André Zylberberg, 1994. "Effort et contrats : quelques enseignements concernant le marché du travail," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 113(2), pages 1-20.
  14. Finus, Michael & Rundshagen, Bianca, 1998. " Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 145-86, July.
  15. Zhao, Rui R., 2006. "Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 263-281, November.
  16. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2010. "A game theoretic approach of war with financial influences," MPRA Paper 38389, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Mathias Nell, 2009. "Contracts obtained by means of bribery: should they be void or valid?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 159-176, April.
  18. Serrano, Roberto & Zapater, Inigo, 1998. "The Three-Legged Race: Cooperating to Compete," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 343-363, February.
  19. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998. "Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation - (Now published in Econometrica, 69(4) (March 2001), pp. 377-411.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 361, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  20. Ambrus, Attila, 2009. "Theories of coalitional rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 676-695, March.
  21. Watson, Joel, 2006. "Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0wx67671, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  22. Caplin, Andrew & Leahy, John, 2006. "The recursive approach to time inconsistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 134-156, November.
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