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Nonzerosum two-person repeated games with incomplete information

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2020. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
  2. James Bergin, 1986. "Information Revelation in Infinitely Repeated Incomplete Information Games," Discussion Papers 692, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 407-432, March.
  4. Jérôme Renault, 2006. "The Value of Markov Chain Games with Lack of Information on One Side," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 31(3), pages 490-512, August.
  5. Heumann, Tibor, 2020. "On the cardinality of the message space in sender–receiver games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 109-118.
  6. Martin W. Cripps & Jonathan P. Thomas, 2003. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(3), pages 433-462, August.
  7. Yingkai Li & Harry Pei, 2020. "Misspecified Beliefs about Time Lags," Papers 2012.07238, arXiv.org.
  8. Fabien Gensbittel & Jérôme Renault, 2015. "The Value of Markov Chain Games with Incomplete Information on Both Sides," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 40(4), pages 820-841, October.
  9. Cripps, Martin W. & Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2007. "Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 287-316, May.
  10. Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2025. "Calibrated Mechanism Design," Papers 2512.17858, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
  11. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1998. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 292-310, November.
  12. Forges, Françoise & Horst, Ulrich, 2018. "Sender–receiver games with cooperation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 52-61.
  13. S. S. Askar & A. Al-khedhairi, 2019. "Analysis of a Four-Firm Competition Based on a Generalized Bounded Rationality and Different Mechanisms," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2019, pages 1-12, May.
  14. Françoise Forges, 2012. "Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games," Post-Print hal-02447604, HAL.
  15. Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Negotiation and Arbitration: A Game-Theoretic Perspective," Discussion Papers 666, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. Bergin, James, 1989. "A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 51-65, February.
  17. Habu, Takuma & Lipnowski, Elliot & Ravid, Doron, 2024. "Knowing the informed player's payoffs and simple play in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
  18. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997. "A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-175, February.
  19. Pei, Harry, 2023. "Repeated communication with private lying costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
  20. Itai Arieli & Manuel Mueller-Frank, 2021. "A General Analysis of Sequential Social Learning," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 46(4), pages 1235-1249, November.
  21. Zheng Peng & Wenxing Zhu, 2013. "An Alternating Direction Method for Nash Equilibrium of Two-Person Games with Alternating Offers," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 157(2), pages 533-551, May.
  22. Tristan Tomala, 2013. "Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 38(4), pages 617-637, November.
  23. Hua, Xiameng & Watson, Joel, 2022. "Starting small in project choice: A discrete-time setting with a continuum of types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  24. Takuo Sugaya & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2019. "Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  25. Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics.
  26. Lucas Pahl, 2024. "Information spillover in multiple zero-sum games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(1), pages 71-104, March.
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