A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games
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- James Bergin, 1986. "A Characterization of Sequential Equilibrium Strategies in Infinitely Repeated Incomplete Information Games," Discussion Papers 686, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Cited by:
- Cripps, Martin W. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 1997. "Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-158, February.
- Françoise Forges, 2012. "Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games," Post-Print hal-02447604, HAL.
- Miao, Jianjun, 2006.
"Competitive equilibria of economies with a continuum of consumers and aggregate shocks,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 274-298, May.
- Jianjun Miao, 2003. "Competitive Equilibria of Economies with a Continuum of Consumers and Aggregate Shocks," Macroeconomics 0310001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jianjun Miao, 2004. "Competitive Equilibria of Economies with a Continuum of Consumers and Aggregate Shocks," CEMA Working Papers 460, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
- Jonathan P. Thomas & Martin Cripps, 2000.
"Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information,"
Game Theory and Information
0004003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Martin W. Cripps & Jonathan Thomas, 2001. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 76, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Salomon, Antoine & Forges, Françoise, 2015.
"Bayesian repeated games and reputation,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 70-104.
- Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4700, CESifo.
- Antoine Salomon & Francoise Forges, 2015. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Post-Print hal-01252921, HAL.
- Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Working Papers hal-00803919, HAL.
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