A Characterization of Sequential Equilibrium Strategies in Infinitely Repeated Incomplete Information Games
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|Date of creation:||Apr 1986|
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- David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003.
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000813, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
- Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 2013.
"Long Term Competition -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis,"
Annals of Economics and Finance,
Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 627-640, November.
- HART, Sergiu, . "Nonzerosum two-person repeated games with incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -636, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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