A Characterization of Sequential Equilibrium Strategies in Infinitely Repeated Incomplete Information Games
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- Bergin, James, 1989. "A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 51-65, February.
References listed on IDEAS
- Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
- Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 2013. "Long Term Competition -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 627-640, November.
- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008.
"The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information,"
World Scientific Book Chapters,in: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-554, May.
- Sergiu Hart, 1985.
"Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information,"
Mathematics of Operations Research,
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- HART, Sergiu, 1985. "Nonzerosum two-person repeated games with incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP 636, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- repec:cor:louvrp:-636 is not listed on IDEAS
- Jean-Pierre Ponssard & Sylvain Sorin, 1981. "Optimal Strategies in zero sum games with almost perfect information," Post-Print hal-00363923, HAL.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Cripps, Martin W. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 1997. "Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-158, February.
- Salomon, Antoine & Forges, Françoise, 2015. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 70-104.
- Martin W. Cripps & Jonathan P. Thomas, 2003.
"Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information,"
Mathematics of Operations Research,
INFORMS, vol. 28(3), pages 433-462, August.
- Jonathan P. Thomas & Martin Cripps, 2000. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," Game Theory and Information 0004003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Martin W. Cripps & Jonathan Thomas, 2001. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," ESE Discussion Papers 76, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Miao, Jianjun, 2006.
"Competitive equilibria of economies with a continuum of consumers and aggregate shocks,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 274-298, May.
- Jianjun Miao, 2003. "Competitive Equilibria of Economies with a Continuum of Consumers and Aggregate Shocks," Macroeconomics 0310001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jianjun Miao, 2004. "Competitive Equilibria of Economies with a Continuum of Consumers and Aggregate Shocks," CEMA Working Papers 460, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
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