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Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Ehlers, Lars, 2014. "Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 64-87.
  2. William Thomson, 2016. "Non-bossiness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 665-696, October.
  3. Ehlers, Lars, 2018. "Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 393-407.
  4. Emilio Guaman & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, 2023. "Coalitional Stability and Incentives in Housing Markets with Incomplete Preferences," Working Papers wp547, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
  5. Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers & Lars-Gunnar Svensson & Ryan Tierney, 2022. "Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(4), pages 3110-3128, November.
  6. Tommy ANDERSSON & Ágnes CSEH & Lars EHLERS & Albin ERLANSON, 2018. "Organizing Time Banks : Lessons from Matching Markets," Cahiers de recherche 11-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  7. Andrew Tai, 2022. "Revealed Preferences of One-Sided Matching," Papers 2210.14388, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
  8. Will Sandholtz & Andrew Tai, 2023. "House-Swapping with Objective Indifferences," Papers 2306.09529, arXiv.org.
  9. Jingsheng Yu & Jun Zhang, 2020. "Fractional Top Trading Cycle on the Full Preference Domain," Papers 2005.09340, arXiv.org.
  10. Ivan Balbuzanov & Maciej H. Kotowski, 2019. "Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(5), pages 1663-1692, September.
  11. José Alcalde & Begoña Subiza, 2014. "Affirmative action and school choice," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 10(3), pages 295-312, September.
  12. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tommy Andersson, 2022. "School Choice," NBER Working Papers 29822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Nicolò, Antonio & Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo, 2017. "Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 508-524.
  14. Jaramillo, Paula & Manjunath, Vikram, 2012. "The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1913-1946.
  15. José Alcalde & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2017. "Fair student placement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(2), pages 293-307, August.
  16. Alcalde, Jose & Subiza, Begoña, 2011. "On Integration Policies and Schooling," MPRA Paper 29145, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Murat Yılmaz & Özgür Yılmaz, 2022. "Stability of an allocation of objects," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 561-580, December.
  18. Diebold, Franz & Bichler, Martin, 2017. "Matching with indifferences: A comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 260(1), pages 268-282.
  19. Fujinaka, Yuji & Miyakawa, Toshiji, 2020. "Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 157-164.
  20. Eun Jeong Heo & Sunghoon Hong & Youngsub Chun, 2021. "Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 1-19, July.
  21. Jingsheng Yu & Jun Zhang, 2020. "Efficient and fair trading algorithms in market design environments," Papers 2005.06878, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
  22. Ahmad, Ghufran, 2021. "Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 136-162.
  23. Hiroaki Shinkawa & Nicolas Chauvet & Guillaume Bachelier & Andr'e Rohm & Ryoichi Horisaki & Makoto Naruse, 2022. "Optimal preference satisfaction for conflict-free joint decisions," Papers 2205.00799, arXiv.org.
  24. Manjunath, Vikram & Westkamp, Alexander, 2021. "Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
  25. Xinsheng Xiong & Xianjia Wang & Kun He, 2022. "A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 98-115, January.
  26. Rajnish Kunar & Kriti Manocha & Josue Ortega, 2020. "On the integration of Shapley-Scarf housing markets," Papers 2004.09075, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
  27. Kumar, Rajnish & Manocha, Kriti & Ortega, Josué, 2022. "On the integration of Shapley–Scarf markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
  28. Ahamad, Mazbahul, 2016. "Envious Preferences in Two-sided Matching," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235482, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  29. Erdil, Aytek & Ergin, Haluk, 2017. "Two-sided matching with indifferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 268-292.
  30. Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2012. "Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 490-509.
  31. Eun Jeong Heo & Sunghoon Hong & Youngsub Chun, 2022. "The top‐trading cycles and chains solution for kidney exchange with immunosuppressants," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 77-91, March.
  32. Aziz, Haris & Brandt, Felix & Harrenstein, Paul, 2013. "Pareto optimality in coalition formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 562-581.
  33. Bade, Sophie, 2019. "Matching with single-peaked preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 81-99.
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