Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment
Citations
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Cited by:
- Banerjee, Shraman, 2021. "Treating Symmetric Buyers Asymmetrically," MPRA Paper 105971, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022.
"Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1463-1500, July.
- Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment," Papers 1811.03579, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
- Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2013. "Auctions Versus Negotiations: The Role of Price Discrimination," ISER Discussion Paper 0873, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
- Hannu Vartiainen, 2003.
"Auction Design without Commitment,"
Working Papers
2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Hannu Vartiainen, 2009. "Auction Design without Commitment," Discussion Papers 44, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- Tanjim Hossain & Fahad Khalil & Matthew Shum, 2016. "Auctioneers as Market Makers: Managing Momentum in Chittagong Tea Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 5843, CESifo.
- Johannes Hörner & Larry Samuelson, 2011.
"Managing Strategic Buyers,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(3), pages 379-425.
- Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2008. "Managing Strategic Buyers," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1684R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Sep 2010.
- Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2009. "Managing Strategic Buyers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000059, David K. Levine.
- Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2010. "Managing Strategic Buyers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000279, David K. Levine.
- Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2011. "Managing Strategic Buyers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000025, David K. Levine.
- Balzer, Benjamin & Rosato, Antonio, 2025.
"Never say never: Optimal exclusion and reserve prices with expectations-based loss-averse buyers,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
- Benjamin Balzer & Antonio Rosato, 2022. "Never Say Never: Optimal Exclusion and Reserve Prices with Expectations-Based Loss-Averse Buyers," Papers 2210.10938, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
- Shraman Banerjee, 2022. "Treating Symmetric Buyers Asymmetrically," Working Papers 2022-02, Shiv Nadar University, Department of Economics.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
- Onur A. Koska & Ilke Onur & Frank Stähler, 2018.
"The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities,"
Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 125(2), pages 107-136, October.
- Onur A. Koska & Ilke Onur & Frank Stähler, 2015. "The Scope of Auctions in the Presence of Downstream Interactions and Information Externalities," CESifo Working Paper Series 5256, CESifo.
- Onur A. Koska & İlke Onur & Frank Stähler, 2016. "The Scope of Auctions in the Presence of Downstream Interactions and Information Externalities," ERC Working Papers 1611, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Sep 2016.
- Robert Zeithammer, 2009. "Commitment in sequential auctioning: advance listings and threshold prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 187-216, January.
- Koska, Onur A. & Stähler, Frank, 2021.
"It ain’t over until it’s over: English auctions with subsequent negotiations,"
International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 121-124.
- Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2020. "It Ain’t Over Until It’s Over: English Auctions with Subsequent Negotiations," Working Papers in Economics 20/04, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes & Gabriel Y. Weintraub, 2019. "Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 711-730, May.
- Jingyu Liu & Bolin Zhang & Lin William Cong & Siguang Li & Xuechao Wang, 2026. "From PBS to ePBS: the Microstructure of Block Building," Papers 2607.11240, arXiv.org.
- Gerardi, Dino & Maestri, Lucas, 2020.
"Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
- Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri, 2015. "Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 401, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Gerardi, Dino, 2018. "Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect," CEPR Discussion Papers 12699, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
- Xu, Xiaoshu, 2025. "Optimal auctions with sequential arrival: Allowing for re-auction and resale," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
- Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2022. "Information design in sequential procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 79-85.
- Lu Ji & Tong Li, 2008. "Multi-round procurement auctions with secret reserve prices: theory and evidence," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 897-923.
- Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Sequential procurement with limited commitment," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Lamping, Jennifer, 2008. "The Value of Commitment in Auctions with Matching," MPRA Paper 24373, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-040, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Maestri, Lucas, 2017. "Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 136-173.
- Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Withers, John A., 2019. "Dynamic regulation revisited: Signal dampening, experimentation and the ratchet effect," DICE Discussion Papers 318, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015.
"Advances in Auctions,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,,
Elsevier.
- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1405, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
- Kaplan, Todd R & Zamir, Shmuel, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," MPRA Paper 54656, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Jenny Simon, 2011. "Financial Markets as a Commitment Device for the Government," 2011 Meeting Papers 447, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Artyom Shneyerov, 2014. "An optimal slow Dutch auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 577-602, November.
- Shanglyu Deng & Qiyao Zhou, 2023. "Recurring Auctions with Costly Entry: Theory and Evidence," Papers 2306.17355, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2025.
- Devanur, Nikhil R. & Peres, Yuval & Sivan, Balasubramanian, 2019. "Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in repeated sales," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 570-588.
- Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020.
"Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
- Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences," ISER Discussion Paper 1001r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, revised Jan 2020.
- Shraman Banerjee, 2024. "Treating symmetric buyers asymmetrically," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 20(2), pages 159-181, June.
- Vitali Gretschko & Martin Pollrich, 2022. "Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5146-5161, July.
- Vasiliki Skreta, 2005. "Revenue Equivalence for Arbitrary Type Spaces," UCLA Economics Online Papers 347, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Mohammad Akbarpour & Shengwu Li, 2020. "Credible Auctions: A Trilemma," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 425-467, March.
- Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2019. "Lemons and Peaches: A (Robust) Multi-stage Buying Mechanism with Multiple Applications," CEPR Discussion Papers 14063, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
- Jenny Simon, 2014. "Imperfect Financial Markets as a Commitment Device for the Government," CESifo Working Paper Series 4902, CESifo.
- Patrick Hummel, 2018. "Reserve prices in repeated auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 273-299, March.
- Xiaogang Che & Tong Li & Jingfeng Lu & Xiaoyong Zheng, 2026. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms With Endogenous Seller Outside Offers," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 67(3), pages 875-891, August.
- Breig, Zachary, 2022. "Repeated contracting without commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Philip M. Fernbach & Steven A. Sloman & Robert St. Louis & Julia N. Shube, 2013. "Explanation Fiends and Foes: How Mechanistic Detail Determines Understanding and Preference," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 39(5), pages 1115-1131.
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