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Revenue Equivalence for Arbitrary Type Spaces

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  • Vasiliki Skreta

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  • Vasiliki Skreta, 2005. "Revenue Equivalence for Arbitrary Type Spaces," UCLA Economics Online Papers 347, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclaol:347
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal, 2002. "Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 583-601, March.
    2. Skreta, Vasiliki, 2015. "Optimal auction design under non-commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 854-890.
    3. Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2007. "Information structures in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 580-609, November.
    4. Krishna, Vijay & Maenner, Eliot, 2001. "Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1113-1119, July.
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