Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Citations

Cited by:

1. Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
   • Tristan Tomala, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Post-Print hal-00464537, HAL.
2. Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 189-228, January.
   • George Mailath & Stephen Morris, "undated". ""Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring''," CARESS Working Papres 99-09, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2000. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0661, Econometric Society.
   • George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000257, www.najecon.org.
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," CARESS Working Papres almost-pub, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, revised 01 Sep 2000.
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1236, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
   • George Mailath & Stephen Morris, "undated". "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers 6bf0f633ff55148107994e092, Penn Economics Department.
   • George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000257, David K. Levine.
   • George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2107, David K. Levine.
3. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2020. "Self-rejecting mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 434-457.
4. Jens Großer & Arthur Schram, 2010. "Public Opinion Polls, Voter Turnout, and Welfare: An Experimental Study," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 700-717, July.
   • Jens Großer & Arthur Schram, 2007. "Public Opinion Polls, Voter Turnout, and Welfare: An Experimental Study," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 014, University of Siena.
5. Contou-Carrère, Pauline & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 14-21, January.
   • Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10073, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
6. Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2006. "Private monitoring in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 179-211, November.
   • Andreas Blume & Paul Heidhues, 2003. "Private Monitoring in Auctions," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
7. Obara Ichiro, 2008. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, March.
   • Ichiro Obara, "undated". "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," UCLA Economics Online Papers 374, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Ichiro Obara, 2006. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001206, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Ichiro Obara, 2007. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000137, UCLA Department of Economics.
8. Cole, Harold L. & Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 2005. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 59-72, October.
   • Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2000. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Working Papers 604, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
   • Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2001. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Staff Report 287, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
9. Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2013. "Finitely repeated games with monitoring options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1929-1952.
10. repec:dau:papers:123456789/2347 is not listed on IDEAS
11. Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Post-Print halshs-00524134, HAL.
12. Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2016. "Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 311-323.
    • Hajime Kobayashi & Katsunori Ohta & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2008. "Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships," KIER Working Papers 650, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
13. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2018. "Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 58-87.
14. Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul & Gerhard Riener, 2012. "Partnerships, Imperfect Monitoring and Outside Options: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    • Alexia Gaudeul & Paolo Crosetto & Gerhard Riener, 2015. "Of the stability of partnerships when individuals have outside options, or why allowing exit is inefficient," Jena Economics Research Papers 2015-001, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    • Gaudeul, A. & Crosetto, P. & Riener, G., 2014. "Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships. An experiment," Working Papers 2014-02, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
15. Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2015. "Approximate implementation in Markovian environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 401-442.
    • Renou , Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2013. "Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments," HEC Research Papers Series 1015, HEC Paris.
16. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 499-519, March.
    • Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," UCLA Economics Working Papers 826, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-255, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    • Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000055, UCLA Department of Economics.
17. Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul & Gerhard Riener, 2012. "Partnerships, Imperfect Monitoring and Outside Options: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    • Alexia Gaudeul & Paolo Crosetto & Gerhard Riener, 2014. "Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships. An experiment," Jena Economics Research Papers 2014-012, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    • Gaudeul, A. & Crosetto, P. & Riener, G., 2014. "Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships. An experiment," Working Papers 2014-02, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
18. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
19. Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman, 2018. "Repetition and cooperation: A model of finitely repeated games with objective ambiguity," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 585, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
20. Yangbo Song & Mofei Zhao, 2023. "Cooperative teaching and learning of actions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1289-1327, November.
21. Solan, Eilon & Zhao, Chang, 2023. "When (not) to publicize inspection results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
22. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2017. "Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
23. repec:kbb:dpaper:2011-44 is not listed on IDEAS
24. Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 281, UCLA Department of Economics.
25. McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2014. "Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 191-212.
26. Renault, Jérôme & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 44-74, July.
    • Marco Scarsini & Sergio Scarlatti & Jérôme Renault, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Post-Print hal-00365583, HAL.
27. Daehyun Kim, 2019. "Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 267-285, March.
28. Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2016. "Finitely Repeated Games with Automatic and Optional Monitoring," Discussion Papers 2016-12, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
29. Daehyun Kim & Ichiro Obara, 2023. "On the Value of Information Structures in Stochastic Games," Papers 2308.09211, arXiv.org.
30. Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2002. "Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 299-321, August.
31. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6381 is not listed on IDEAS
32. Jeffery Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2004. "Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit," Discussion Papers 1381, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
33. Jérôme Renault & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2007. "A Minority Game with Bounded Recall," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(4), pages 873-889, November.
    • Tristan Tomala & Jerome Renault & Marco Scarsini, 2007. "A Minority Game with Bounded Recall," Post-Print hal-00538967, HAL.