Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Citations

Cited by:

1. Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
   • Tristan Tomala, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Post-Print hal-00464537, HAL.
2. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2020. "Self-rejecting mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 434-457.
3. Contou-Carrère, Pauline & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 14-21, January.
   • Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Post-Print halshs-00524134, HAL.
   • Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00524134, HAL.
   • Pauline Contou-Carrère & Tristan Tomala, 2010. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10073, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
4. Allen Vong, 2025. "Dynamic Correlation as an Incentive Device," Papers 2511.02436, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2026.
5. Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2013. "Finitely repeated games with monitoring options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1929-1952.
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7. Obara Ichiro, 2008. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, March.
   • Ichiro Obara, "undated". "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," UCLA Economics Online Papers 374, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Ichiro Obara, 2007. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000137, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Ichiro Obara, 2006. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001206, UCLA Department of Economics.
8. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2018. "Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 58-87.
9. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 499-519, March.
   • Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," UCLA Economics Working Papers 826, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-255, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
   • Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000055, UCLA Department of Economics.
10. Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 189-228, January.
    • George Mailath & Stephen Morris, "undated". "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers 6bf0f633ff55148107994e092, Penn Economics Department.
    • George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000257, www.najecon.org.
    • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2000. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0661, Econometric Society.
    • George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000257, David K. Levine.
    • George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2107, David K. Levine.
    • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," CARESS Working Papres almost-pub, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, revised 01 Sep 2000.
    • George Mailath & Stephen Morris, "undated". ""Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring''," CARESS Working Papres 99-09, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1236, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
11. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
12. Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman, 2018. "Repetition and cooperation: A model of finitely repeated games with objective ambiguity," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 585, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
13. Yangbo Song & Mofei Zhao, 2023. "Cooperative teaching and learning of actions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1289-1327, November.
14. Solan, Eilon & Zhao, Chang, 2023. "When (not) to publicize inspection results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
15. Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2016. "Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 311-323.
    • Hajime Kobayashi & Katsunori Ohta & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2008. "Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships," KIER Working Papers 650, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
16. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2017. "Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
17. repec:kbb:dpaper:2011-44 is not listed on IDEAS
18. Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 281, UCLA Department of Economics.
19. McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2014. "Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 191-212.
20. Renault, Jérôme & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 44-74, July.
    • Marco Scarsini & Sergio Scarlatti & Jérôme Renault, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Post-Print hal-00365583, HAL.
21. Daehyun Kim, 2019. "Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 267-285, March.
22. Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2015. "Approximate implementation in Markovian environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 401-442.
    • Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2013. "Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments," Working Papers hal-02058241, HAL.
    • Renou , Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2013. "Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments," HEC Research Papers Series 1015, HEC Paris.
23. Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2016. "Finitely Repeated Games with Automatic and Optional Monitoring," Discussion Papers 2016-12, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
24. Jens Großer & Arthur Schram, 2010. "Public Opinion Polls, Voter Turnout, and Welfare: An Experimental Study," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 700-717, July.
    • Jens Großer & Arthur Schram, 2007. "Public Opinion Polls, Voter Turnout, and Welfare: An Experimental Study," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 014, University of Siena.
25. Kim, Daehyun & Obara, Ichiro, 0. "Asymptotic value of monitoring structures in stochastic games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    • Daehyun Kim & Ichiro Obara, 2023. "Asymptotic Value of Monitoring Structures in Stochastic Games," Papers 2308.09211, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2025.
26. Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2006. "Private monitoring in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 179-211, November.
    • Andreas Blume & Paul Heidhues, 2003. "Private Monitoring in Auctions," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
27. Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2002. "Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 299-321, August.
28. Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul & Gerhard Riener, 2012. "Partnerships, Imperfect Monitoring and Outside Options: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    • Alexia Gaudeul & Paolo Crosetto & Gerhard Riener, 2014. "Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships. An experiment," Jena Economics Research Papers 2014-012, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    • Alexia Gaudeul & Paolo Crosetto & Gerhard Riener, 2015. "Of the stability of partnerships when individuals have outside options, or why allowing exit is inefficient," Jena Economics Research Papers 2015-001, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    • Gaudeul, A. & Crosetto, P. & Riener, G., 2014. "Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships. An experiment," Working Papers 2014-02, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
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30. Jeffery Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2004. "Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit," Discussion Papers 1381, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
31. Jérôme Renault & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2007. "A Minority Game with Bounded Recall," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(4), pages 873-889, November.
    • Tristan Tomala & Jerome Renault & Marco Scarsini, 2007. "A Minority Game with Bounded Recall," Post-Print hal-00538967, HAL.
32. Cole, Harold L. & Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 2005. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 59-72, October.
    • Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2000. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Working Papers 604, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    • Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2001. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Staff Report 287, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.