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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2064R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jul 2017.
  2. Alexander Teytelboym & Shengwu Li & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour & Piotr Dworczak, 2021. "Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(3), pages 709-750, July.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," Working Papers 085_2016, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  4. Lu, Jiaxuan, 2023. "The economics of China’s between-city height competition: A regression discontinuity approach," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
  5. S. Nageeb Ali & Nima Haghpanah & Xiao Lin & Ron Siegel, 2020. "How to Sell Hard Information," Papers 2010.08037, arXiv.org.
  6. Itzhak Rasooly & Carlos Gavidia-Calderon, 2020. "The importance of being discrete: on the inaccuracy of continuous approximations in auction theory," Papers 2006.03016, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
  7. Taisuke Otsu & Martin Pesendorfer & Yuya Sasaki & Yuya Takahashi, 2022. "Estimation Of (Static Or Dynamic) Games Under Equilibrium Multiplicity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1165-1188, August.
  8. Feng, Xin, 2020. "Information disclosure on the contest mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 148-156.
  9. Balzer, Benjamin & Rosato, Antonio & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2022. "Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
  10. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Robust Private Supply of a Public Good," Papers 2201.00923, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
  11. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 586-591, May.
  12. Carroll, Gabriel, 2016. "Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 334-361.
  13. Wanchang Zhang, 2021. "Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism," Papers 2105.05427, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
  14. Benjamin Brooks & Songzi Du, 2021. "Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 1313-1360, May.
  15. Mark Armstrong & Jidong Zhou, 2022. "Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(2), pages 534-577, February.
  16. Masaki Miyashita & Takashi Ui, 2023. "LQG Information Design," Papers 2312.09479, arXiv.org.
  17. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 744-759.
  18. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2022. "Counterfactuals with Latent Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(1), pages 343-368, January.
  19. Andreas A. Haupt & Nicole Immorlica & Brendan Lucier, 2023. "Certification Design for a Competitive Market," Papers 2301.13449, arXiv.org.
  20. Dirk Bergemann & Paul Duetting & Renato Paes Leme & Song Zuo, 2021. "Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2285, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  21. Pycia, Marek & Woodward, Kyle, 2021. "Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid," CEPR Discussion Papers 15656, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  22. Emiliano Catonini & Antonio Penta, 2022. "Backward Induction Reasoning beyond Backward Induction," Working Papers 1315, Barcelona School of Economics.
  23. Alex Suzdaltsev, 2020. "Distributionally Robust Pricing in Independent Private Value Auctions," Papers 2008.01618, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2020.
  24. Hyeon Park, 2019. "Multi-bidder First Price Auction with Beliefs," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 7(1), pages 140-160, June.
  25. Kevin He & Fedor Sandomirskiy & Omer Tamuz, 2021. "Private Private Information," Papers 2112.14356, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
  26. Sylvain Chassang & Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan M. Ortner, 2019. "Data Driven Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids," NBER Working Papers 25654, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2021. "Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 16402, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  28. Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin & Morris, Stephen, 2020. "Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
  29. Yingkai Li, 2021. "Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information," Papers 2103.05788, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
  30. Aijun Liu & Yaxuan Xiao & Zengxian Li & Ruiyao Wang, 2022. "An agent‐based multiattribute reverse auction approach for online secondhand commodities," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(1), pages 129-145, January.
  31. Garrett, Daniel F., 2020. "Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting," TSE Working Papers 20-1140, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  32. Laohakunakorn, Krittanai & Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2019. "Private and common value auctions with ambiguity over correlation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 101410, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  33. Xu Lang, 2023. "A Belief-Based Characterization of Reduced-Form Auctions," Papers 2307.04070, arXiv.org.
  34. Kai Hao Yang & Alexander K. Zentefis, 2022. "Gerrymandering and the Limits of Representative Democracy," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2328, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  35. Sosung Baik & Sung-Ha Hwang, 2022. "Revenue Comparisons of Auctions with Ambiguity Averse Sellers," Papers 2211.12669, arXiv.org.
  36. Tingjun Liu & Dan Bernhardt, 2021. "Rent Extraction with Securities Plus Cash," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(4), pages 1869-1912, August.
  37. Kim, Kyungmin & Koh, Youngwoo, 2022. "Auctions with flexible information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 256-281.
  38. Kim, Jinwoo & Koh, Youngwoo, 2020. "Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  39. Modibo Camara & Jason Hartline & Aleck Johnsen, 2020. "Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior," Papers 2009.05518, arXiv.org.
  40. Laohakunakorn, Krittanai & Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2019. "Private and common value auctions with ambiguity over correlation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
  41. Gretschko, Vitali & Mass, Helene, 2024. "Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
  42. Tommaso Denti & Doron Ravid, 2023. "Robust Predictions in Games with Rational Inattention," Papers 2306.09964, arXiv.org.
  43. Gretschko, Vitali & Mass, Helene, 2018. "Endogenous worst-case beliefs in first-price auctions," ZEW Discussion Papers 18-056, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  44. Komal Malik, 2022. "Optimal Robust Mechanism in Bilateral Trading," Papers 2212.14367, arXiv.org.
  45. Yi-Chun Chen & Gaoji Hu & Xiangqian Yang, 2022. "Information Design in Allocation with Costly Verification," Papers 2210.16001, arXiv.org.
  46. Takashi Ui, 2020. "LQG Information Design," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 018, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
  47. Catonini, Emiliano & Penta, Antonio, 2022. "Backward Induction Reasoning beyond Backward Induction," TSE Working Papers 22-1298, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  48. Vasilis Syrgkanis & Elie Tamer & Juba Ziani, 2017. "Inference on Auctions with Weak Assumptions on Information," Papers 1710.03830, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2018.
  49. Suzdaltsev, Alex, 2022. "Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
  50. Mohammad Akbarpour & Shengwu Li, 2020. "Credible Auctions: A Trilemma," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 425-467, March.
  51. Andreas Hefti & Peiyao Shen & Regina Betz, 2019. "Market power and information effects in a multi-unit auction," ECON - Working Papers 320, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  52. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2018. "A Very Robust Auction Mechanism," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 16 Jan 2018.
  53. Mass, Helene, 2018. "Strategies under strategic uncertainty," ZEW Discussion Papers 18-055, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  54. Emiliano Cantonini & Antonio Penta, 2022. "Backward induction reasoning beyond backward induction," Economics Working Papers 1815, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  55. Xi Chen & Binghui Peng, 2023. "Complexity of Equilibria in First-Price Auctions under General Tie-Breaking Rules," Papers 2303.16388, arXiv.org.
  56. Zhuoqiong Chen, 2021. "All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(1), pages 33-64, June.
  57. Jonathan Libgober & Xiaosheng Mu, 2022. "Coasian Dynamics under Informational Robustness," Papers 2202.04616, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
  58. He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2022. "Correlation-robust auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
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