Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game
Citations
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- Juan I. Beccuti, 2014. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms under Imperfect Commitment: Extending to the Multi-Period Case," Diskussionsschriften dp1402, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Cripps, Martin W. & Dekel, Eddie & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2005. "Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 259-272, April.
- Marina Bánnikova & José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, 2022. "The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-8, November.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Gao, Ying & Pei, Harry, 2022.
"A reputation for honesty,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Drew Fudenberg & Ying Gao & Harry Pei, 2020. "A Reputation for Honesty," Papers 2011.07159, arXiv.org.
- T. Tony Ke & Monic Sun & Baojun Jiang, 2024. "Peer-to-Peer Markets with Bilateral Ratings," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(5), pages 1081-1101, September.
- Devanur, Nikhil R. & Peres, Yuval & Sivan, Balasubramanian, 2019. "Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in repeated sales," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 570-588.
- Vincent Conitzer & Curtis R. Taylor & Liad Wagman, 2012. "Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(2), pages 277-292, March.
- Hwang Joongsan, 2025. "Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information and Risk Preference: An Analysis of Brinkmanship," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 31(3), pages 259-303.
- Yingkai Li & Harry Pei, 2020. "Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games," Papers 2007.14002, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
- Arieh Gavious & Ella Segev, 2017. "Price Discrimination Based on Buyers’ Purchase History," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 229-265, June.
- Kostas Bimpikis & Ilan Morgenstern & Daniela Saban, 2024. "Data Tracking Under Competition," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 72(2), pages 514-532, March.
- Darryl T. Banks & J. Wesley Hutchinson & Robert J. Meyer, 2002. "Reputation in Marketing Channels: Repeated-Transactions Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 21(3), pages 251-272, December.
- Negin Golrezaei & Adel Javanmard & Vahab Mirrokni, 2021. "Dynamic Incentive-Aware Learning: Robust Pricing in Contextual Auctions," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 297-314, January.
- Breig, Zachary, 2019. "Endogenous and exogenous commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.
- Patrick Hummel, 2018. "Reserve prices in repeated auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 273-299, March.
- Yonatan Gur & Gregory Macnamara & Daniela Saban, 2022. "Sequential Procurement with Contractual and Experimental Learning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 2714-2731, April.
- Jihong Lee & Qingmin Liu, 2009. "Reputation and Repeated Bargaining with a Third Party," 2009 Meeting Papers 151, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Harry Pei, 2025. "Commitment, Conflict, and Status Quo in Bargaining," Papers 2503.01053, arXiv.org.
- Curtis Taylor & Liad Wagman, 2008. "Who Benefits From Online Privacy?," Working Papers 08-26, NET Institute.
- Kambe, Shinsuke, 1999. "Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 217-237, August.
- Quitz'e Valenzuela-Stookey, 2020. "Screening and Information-Sharing Externalities," Papers 2011.04013, arXiv.org.
- Jia, Kunhao & Liao, Xiuwu & Feng, Juan, 2018. "Selling or leasing? Dynamic pricing of software with upgrades," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 266(3), pages 1044-1061.
- Jihong Lee & Qingmin Liu, 2008. "The Dynamics of Bargaining Postures: The Role of a Third Party," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Oliver Gürtler & Lennart Struth, 2025.
"Do Workers Benefit From Wage Transparency Rules?,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 66(3), pages 1099-1128, August.
- Oliver Gürtler & Lennart Struth, 2021. "Do Workers Benefit from Wage Transparency Rules?," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 105, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
- Li, Yingkai & Pei, Harry, 2021. "Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
- Zhang, Xubing & Jiang, Bo, 2014. "Increasing Price Transparency: Implications of Consumer Price Posting for Consumers' Haggling Behavior and a Seller's Pricing Strategies," Journal of Interactive Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 68-85.
- Breig, Zachary, 2022. "Repeated contracting without commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Juan I. Beccuti, 2014. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms under Imperfect Commitment," Diskussionsschriften dp1401, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
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