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Citations for "Contract Renegotiation: A Simple Framework and Implications for Organization Theory"

by Paul Beaudry & Michel Poitevin

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  1. Hindriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2009. "Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 385-397, September.
  2. Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Delegation and dynamic incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 495-520, 09.
  3. Emanuele Gerratana & Levent Kockesen, 2012. "Renegotiation-Proof Third-Party Contracts under Asymmetric Information," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1208, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
  4. Jonathan Treussard, 2005. "Life-Cycle Consumption Plans and Portfolio Policies in a Heath-Jarrow-Morton Economy," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-033, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  5. Gerratana Emanuele & Koçkesen Levent, 2012. "Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-49, July.
  6. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(2), pages 816-852.
  7. Levent Koçkesen & Emanuele Gerratana, 2008. "Delegation with Incomplete and Renegotiable Contracts," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 0803., Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
  8. Emanuele Gerratana & Levent Koçkesen, 2015. "Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(3), pages 173-209, September.
  9. Ambec, Stefan & Barla, Philippe, 2002. "A theoretical foundation of the Porter hypothesis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 355-360, May.
  10. Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2000. "Organizational Design of R & D Activities," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0190, Econometric Society.
  11. Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2016. "Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(2), pages 115-143, June.
  12. Shin, Dongsoo, 2015. "Incentives and management styles," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 22-31.
  13. AMBEC Stefan & POITEVIN Michel, 2008. "Marketing vs Engineering: Who Should Decide ?," LERNA Working Papers 08.22.266, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
  14. Theilen Bernd, 2008. "Lobbying and Contract Delegation in Public Procurement," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-35, September.
  15. Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2013. "Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 473-501.
  16. Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée, 2013. "Contracts offered by bureaucrats," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 686-711, December.
  17. Watson, Joel & Buzard, Kristy, 2012. "Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
  18. Watson, Joel & Buzard, Kristy, 2012. "Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
  19. Michel Poitevin, 1995. "Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design," Discussion Papers 1135, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  20. Maria Goltsman, 2011. "Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 495-526, 09.
  21. Dilip Mookherjee, 2006. "Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 367-390, June.
  22. Evans, Robert & Reiche, Sönje, 2015. "Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1159-1187.
  23. repec:inu:caeprp:2014004 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Zvika Neeman & Gregory Pavlov, 2010. "Renegotiation-proof Mechanism Design," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20101, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  25. Mostafa Beshkar, 2014. "Arbitration and Renegotiation in Trade Agreements," Caepr Working Papers 2014-004, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
  26. Théophile, AZOMAHOU & Raouf, BOUCEKKINE & Phu, NUYEN VAN, 2003. "Energy consumption, technological progress and economic policy," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2003025, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.