Optimal Task Design: To Integrate or Separate Planning and Implementation?

Citations

Cited by:

1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7976, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
2. Joshua Blonz, 2019. "The Welfare Costs of Misaligned Incentives: Energy Inefficiency and the Principal-Agent Problem," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-071, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
3. Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 75-96.
   • Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01156552, HAL.
   • Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," Post-Print halshs-01156552, HAL.
4. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2015. "Merger efficiency and managerial incentives," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 51-63.
   • Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2013. "Merger Efficiency and Managerial Incentives," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 410, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
5. Shin, Dongsoo, 2008. "Information acquisition and optimal project management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 1032-1043, July.
6. repec:cgr:cgsser:01-04 is not listed on IDEAS
7. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 211-222.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2016. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," CEPR Discussion Papers 11217, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
   • Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018. "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," MPRA Paper 90800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
8. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2014. "Merger Performance and Managerial Incentives," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 02/2014, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
9. Choe, Chongwoo & Ishiguro, Shingo, 2008. "On the (Sub)optimality of Multi-tier Hierarchies: Coordination versus Motivation," MPRA Paper 13451, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Chongwoo Choe & Shingo Ishiguro, 2009. "On The (Sub) Optimality Of Multi-Tier Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Motivation," Monash Economics Working Papers 18/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
10. Justin Downs, 2021. "Information gathering by overconfident agents," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 554-568, August.
11. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(1), pages 56-74, March.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2010. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," CEPR Discussion Papers 7681, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    • Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," MPRA Paper 41966, University Library of Munich, Germany.
12. Wataru Nozawa, 2026. "Investment origination and screening: Separation or integration?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 46(1), pages 55-60.
13. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 108-117.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," MPRA Paper 36914, University Library of Munich, Germany.
14. Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2007. "Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 271-299, November.
15. Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2012. "Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(3), pages 442-474, September.
    • Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2011. "Risk Allocation and the Costs and Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 1104, CEPREMAP.
    • Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2012. "Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships," Post-Print hal-00813153, HAL.
    • Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2012. "Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00813153, HAL.
16. Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2004. "Choice of technology in outsourcing: an endogenous information structure," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 165-178, June.
17. Kim, Doyoung, 2013. "Delegation of information verification," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 488-500.
18. Shin, Dongsoo, 2015. "Incentives and management styles," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 22-31.
19. Patrick W Schmitz, 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17109, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," MPRA Paper 112839, University Library of Munich, Germany.
20. Peter-J. Jost & Frauke Lammers, 2010. "Organization of Project Evaluation and Implementation under Moral Hazard," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(2), pages 212-238, June.
21. Laux, Volker, 2008. "On the value of influence activities for capital budgeting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 625-635, March.
22. Raffaele Fiocco, 2012. "Competition and regulation with product differentiation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 287-307, December.
23. Bing Ye & Sanxi Li, 2018. "Competitive contracts with productive information gathering," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 1-17, May.
24. Martimort, David & Iossa, Elisabetta, 2013. "Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 9552, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
25. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2013. "Bad Mergers Revisited: An Incentive Perspective," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79914, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
26. Blonz, Joshua, 2018. "The Welfare Costs of Misaligned Incentives: Energy Inefficiency and the Principal-Agent Problem," RFF Working Paper Series 18-28, Resources for the Future.
27. Martimort, David & Gromb, Denis, 2004. "The Organization of Delegated Expertise," CEPR Discussion Papers 4572, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    • Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2004. "The Organization of Delegated Expertise," IDEI Working Papers 284, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
28. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2006. "Gathering Information By A Partially Informed Agent," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(04), pages 675-694.
29. Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J., 2011. "Conflicting tasks and moral hazard: Theory and experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(8), pages 1094-1108.