IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login

Citations for "International Trade Bargaining And The Most-Favored-Nation Clause"

by Rodney D. Ludema

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window

  1. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2000. "GATT-Think," NBER Working Papers 8005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Cebi, Pinar & Ludema, Rodney, 2002. "The Rise and Fall of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause," Working Papers 15853, United States International Trade Commission, Office of Economics.
  3. Bagwell,K. & Staiger,R.W., 1999. "Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT," Working papers 6, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  4. G. Schwartz, 2000. "Non-Enforceability of Trade Treaties and the Most-Favored Nation Clause: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Investment Distortions," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s17, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  5. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "Backward stealing and forward manipulation in the WTO," Discussion Papers 0405-06, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  6. Saggi, Kamal, 2009. "The MFN clause, welfare, and multilateral cooperation between countries of unequal size," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 132-143, January.
  7. Ludema, Rodney D. & Mayda, Anna Maria, 2009. "Do countries free ride on MFN?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 137-150, April.
  8. Madanmohan Ghosh & Carlo Perroni & John Whalley, 1999. "The Value of MFN Treatment to Developing Countries," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9907, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  9. Edwin L.-C. Lai, 2008. "The most-favored nation rule in club enlargement negotiation," Working Papers 0815, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  10. McCalman, Phillip, 2002. "Multi-lateral trade negotiations and the Most Favored Nation clause," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 151-176, June.
  11. Saggi, Kamal, 2004. "Tariffs and the most favored nation clause," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 341-368, July.
  12. Furusawa, Taiji, 1999. "The negotiation of sustainable tariffs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 321-345, August.
  13. Saggi, Kamal & Sengul, Faruk & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2007. "Sustaining multilateral cooperation among asymmetric countries: Does MFN help?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 543-562.
  14. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2002. "Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO," Discussion Papers 0102-37, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  15. Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C., 2001. "Economic and legal aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation clause," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 233-279, June.
  16. Ludema, Rodney D & Mayda, Anna Maria, 2010. "Do terms-of-trade effects matter for trade agreements? Evidence from WTO countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 7695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. James Lake & Halis M. Yildiz, 2014. "On the different geographic characteristics of Free Trade Agreements and Customs Unions," Departmental Working Papers 1403, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
  18. Ethier, Wilfred J., 2001. "Theoretical problems in negotiating trade liberalization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 209-232, June.
  19. Rodney D. Ludema, 1998. "On the Value of Preferential Trade Agreements in Multilateral Negotiations," International Trade 9802003, EconWPA.
  20. Deepak Lal, 1993. "Trade Blocs and Multilateral Free Trade," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 349-358, 09.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.