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Transnational Access to Court for Commercial Claims: The Shortcomings of International Commercial Arbitration and Litigation

Author

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  • Hermann Hoffmann

    (George Washington University Law School, University of Bremen & ZenTra)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Hermann Hoffmann, 2014. "Transnational Access to Court for Commercial Claims: The Shortcomings of International Commercial Arbitration and Litigation," ZenTra Working Papers in Transnational Studies 37 / 2014, ZenTra - Center for Transnational Studies, revised Oct 2014.
    • Handle: RePEc:zen:wpaper:37
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    File URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2504459
    File Function: First version, 2014
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peter T. Leeson, 2008. "How Important is State Enforcement for Trade?," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 61-89.
    2. Oliver E. Williamson, 2005. "The Economics of Governance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 1-18, May.
    3. Paul Berman, "undated". "The Globalization of Jurisdiction," University of Connecticut School of Law Working Papers uconn_ucwps-1012, University of Connecticut School of Law.
    4. Gerhard Wagner, 2010. "Legal Origin, Civil Procedure, and the Quality of Contract Enforcement," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(1), pages 171-177, March.
    5. Bruce Benson, 1999. "To Arbitrate or To Litigate: That Is the Question," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 91-151, September.
    6. Mattli, Walter, 2001. "Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 919-947, October.
    7. Henry Hansmann, 2006. "Corporation and Contract," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 1-19.
    8. Bernstein, Lisa, 1992. "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 115-157, January.
    9. Klerman, Daniel, 2009. "The emergence of English commercial law: Analysis inspired by the Ottoman experience," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 638-646, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Access to Court; International Commercial Arbitration; International Litigation; Hague Convention; New York Convention; costs; social contract; European Convention on Human Rights; international transactions; commercial law; access to justice gap; global governance; fees;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • B15 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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